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 The Program Executive Office for Unmanned Aviation and Strike Weapons re-
quested the Naval Postgraduate School conduct an investigation into the rapid application 
of unmanned aerial systems (UASs) be completed to counter the extension of piracy op-
erations into blue water off the Horn of Africa (HOA).  The request was focused on clos-
ing the capability gap pending the fielding of systems currently in development, namely 
the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Arial System (UAS).  The 
Pirate Mother Ship Warning and Reporting System (PMSW&RS) project team focused 
on understanding the current operational environment and the tactics necessary for de-
tecting, locating, classifying, identifying, tracking, and reporting on pirate activities in 
order to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa.  In addition, the inventory of currently 
available unmanned aerial systems, as well as systems available by the end of calendar 
year 2012, was reviewed for applicability to the problem at hand.   Four research ques-
tions were posed and endorsed by stakeholders: 
• What capability gaps need to be addressed with respect to countering the 
pirate application of mother ships? 
• Can formation and application of a system comprised of existing or near 
term intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets meet 
stakeholders’ needs for countering the pirate application of mother ships? 
• What characteristics, signatures and patterns mark a pirate mother ship? 
• What sensor payload requirements are needed to exploit the characteristics, 
signatures and patterns of pirate mother ships? 
During the needs analysis phase, an iterative process between the team and stake-




Table 1. “Measures of Effectiveness.” This table shows the measures of effectiveness 
most relevant for interdicting pirates or identifying pirate mother ships. 
 
A broad market survey was conducted that examined various mission concepts 
and systems. The use of manned vehicles for detecting, locating, classifying, identifying 
and tracking was discounted early in the analysis due to the effective time on station du-
rations required to complete the mission.  The Long Endurance Multi-intelligence Vehi-
cle (LEMV), Heron TP, and Guardian were selected as viable UAS options based on their 
endurance, mission payloads, availability and cost effectiveness. 
Some research was performed to determine the viability of using weaponized 
UASs and directly supporting interdiction, but in interviews with past and current UAS 
operators, it was suggested that legal challenges superseded technical challenges.  As a 
result, the focus was shifted strictly towards ISR.  Based on these decisions, assumptions 





Measures of Performance (MOPs) were derived from MOEs.  Using the MOEs 
and MOPs, functional, physical, and operational architectures were designed.  Baseline 
development and analysis was also performed.  Research into current UAS sensor capa-
bility, UAS effective time on station (ETOS), and speed formed the basis for detailed as-
sessment of PMSW&RS capabilities and limitations.  A Quality Function Deployment 
(QFD) analysis used the MOEs through the functional and physical architecture baselines 
in order to weight the PMSW&RS design characteristics.  The resulting Value System 
Design formed a level base for Overall Measure of Effectiveness (OMOE) analysis of the 
PMSW&RS physical alternatives: LEMV, Heron TP, and Guardian. 
 
 
Table 2. “OMOE Score versus Initial Procurement Costs.” 
Comparison of CAIV scores noted in Table 2 shows that LEMV would provide 
the best solution by meeting both the threshold and objective performances at the lowest 
cost. Microsoft Excel modeling was used for the OMOE and cost as an independent vari-
able (CAIV) analyses by providing the number of assets needed from each UAS to meet 
the following thresholds and objectives. 
 
• Detection range: Range to detect RCS 25 square meters (m2) at minimum 
of 20k ft altitude, Threshold: 80 miles, Objective: 200 nautical miles 
• Track Capacity: number of surface tracks maintained while in sensor 
view, Threshold: 150, Objective: 200 
• Endurance:  Hours on station at mission radius, Threshold: 12, Objective: 
24. 

























Heron 2 2 168  $   2,251,200  $   2,251,200 2.251 2.251 0.780
LEMV 4 5 168  $   1,411,200  $   1,764,000 1.411 1.764 0.789
Guardian 4 4 168  $   3,158,400  $   3,158,400 3.158 3.158 0.690
xviii 
 
• Detection Accuracy: Surface vessel detection range of accuracy for RCS 
(m2) at 20k ft, Threshold: 500 ft, Objective: 200 ft 
• Speed:  UAS mission loiter speed, Threshold:  80 knots, Objective: 200 
knots 
• LOS: Line of Sight communications capability. Data was not available on 
all candidate UASs, except if LOS capability was on board, Threshold: 40 
nautical miles (nmi), Objective: 182.4 nautical miles (nmi) 
• BLOS:  Beyond Line Of Sight communications, range of radio with use of 
SATCOM, Data was not available on all candidate UASs, except if LOS 
capability was on board, Threshold: 40 nautical miles (nmi). Objective: 
192 nautical miles (nmi) 
• NIIRS:  National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scales number for quali-
ty of imagery, Threshold: 7, Objective: 8 
• Speed: Threshold: 80 knots Objective: 200 knots 
OMOE analysis and Microsoft Excel modeling both indicated the mission could 
be completed by each platform, given the right number of assets. The optimum platform 
for mission success at both threshold and objective probabilities of detection is the 
LEMV. 
LEMV dominated in cost at the threshold and objective level, 1.4M and 1.7M re-
spectively, as well as performance at a OMOE value of .789.  Heron TP achieved the 
next lowest cost at both the threshold and objective values of 2.25M along with the se-
cond best OMOE score of .780.  Of the three potential solutions considered, Guardian 
had the most expensive cost at the threshold and objective levels with a value of 3.1M 
along with the worst performance OMOE value of .690.   Notably, the Guardian’s speed 
outperformed LEMV, enabling a higher search rate.  Heron TP’s loiter altitude of 40,000 
feet enabled a wider field of view and expanded detection range.  The LEMV boasts 21-
days of effective time on station (ETOS).  This and its low cost in comparison to other 
UASs were the key attributes in selection. 
xix 
 
The PMSW&RS team recommends the LEMV as the recommended solution to 
satisfy stakeholder needs because LEMV achieves an acceptable OMOE score at the 
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I.	   BACKGROUND 	  
A.  PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA 
 The ability to defend commercial ships against pirate attacks has proven especially dif-
ficult for the international community.  The recent international response to piracy in the Gulf 
of Aden has been successful in reducing the success of pirate attacks but has resulted in new 
tactic by pirates.  These new tactics involve the use of mother ships to extend operations off the 
coast of Africa beyond the typical range of standard skiffs.  Not only do these ships extend 
range, but they function as “floating bases loaded with skiffs” and Fifth Fleet Vice Admiral 
Mark Fox has called them “game changers.”  Multiple military organizations are involved in 
the counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Arica.  Chief among these organizations are: 
NATO, EUNAVFOR, Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, CTF 150, and ALINDIEN operated 
by the French Force Commander, Indian Ocean (Fellman 2011). 
As a global force, the United States Navy is relied upon to protect American commer-
cial shipping anywhere around the world.  At present, the greatest threat to commercial ship-
ping is in the area of the Horn of Africa, as depicted in Figure 1, “Horn of Africa Area of Re-
sponsibility (HOA AOR).” Current piracy tactics allow for operations throughout this area by 
using motherships, usually converted from fishing trawlers, dhows or small transport ships by 







Figure 1. “Horn of Africa Area of Responsibility (HOA AOR).”(The United Kingdom 
Hydrographic Office 2010) 
B.	   WEATHER 
The size of the area and the quantity of commercial traffic make escorting ships via sur-
face security ships cost prohibitive.  The 1958 Geneva Convention and the 1982 Safety of Life 
At Sea (SOLAS) Convention both direct nations to cooperate in suppression of piracy on the 
high seas (Department of the Navy & Department of Homeland Security, 2007).  Countering 
the piracy threat requires a multifaceted approach with all stakeholders contributing and the 
world’s navies providing cost-effective solutions.  One such solution area is the gathering of 
intelligence, a capability that is almost solely possessed by nation states and their acting gov-
ernments.  Naval forces need better intelligence to counter piracy and commercial fleets need 
access to intelligence to develop and apply tactics in order to avoid contact with pirates. 
Pirate attacks have remained unabated and are getting bigger and bolder according to 
the IMB report dated Thursday July 14, 2011 (International Maritime Bureau 2011).  Accord-
ing the IMB, “Pirate attacks on the world’s seas totaled 266 in the first six months of 2011, up 
from 196 incidents in the same period last year” (International Maritime Bureau 2011).  Fur-
3 
 
ther, from February to July of 2011 “Somali pirates attacked more vessels than ever before” 
(International Maritime Bureau 2011) and in “June, for the first time, pirates fired on ships in 
rough seas in the Indian Ocean during the monsoon season” (International Maritime Bureau 
2011).   Previously this has been a rare occurrence due to the difficulty of boarding a moving 
ship in rough seas (International Maritime Bureau 2011). 
As the piracy escalates and becomes widespread in the Indian Ocean, there is a corre-
sponding increase in cost of transporting goods not only between European and Asian coun-
tries but around the world.  According to Major Dennis Sampson, “pirates retain an advantage 
by operating within or escaping to locations within the territorial waters of countries unable to 
oversee or lawfully take action against pirates” (Sampson 2009).  
The primary objective of piracy is to exact a ransom for the release of the crew mem-
bers, the ships, and their cargo.  It is becoming a booming enterprise for the Somali pirates 
whose income from ransom has been estimated to be about 39 million Euro (about $58 million) 
in 2009 (Utler 2011) and $238 million in 2010 (Gill 2011).  However, indirect costs of piracy 
are much higher and estimated to be between $7 to 12 billion as they also include insurance, 
naval support, legal proceedings, re-routing of slower ships, and individual protective steps 
taken by ship-owners (Gill 2011).  
Given the attractive financial gains from piracy, a 2011 report published by Geopolicity 
Inc. indicates that the number of pirates could double by 2016, with an increase of 400 pirates 
each year.  This incentive to commit piracy would earn a pirate up to $79,000 per year equating 



















Figure 2. “NCIS Pirate Seasonal Attacks.” (Unclassified Data) 
The weather within the HOA AOR can be troublesome for pirate operations, especially 
during the monsoon seasons.  There are two monsoon seasons, one in the summer between 
June and August, and the other in the winter between December and February.  Piracy attacks 
during the summer monsoon season are half the normal monthly rate (Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service 2011). Figure 2, “NCIS Pirate Seasonal Attacks,” relates pirate attacks to 
the seasons of the year.  The summer monsoon produces waves up to seven and eight meters 
high and winds above thirty five knots while the winter monsoon causes waves up to two me-
ters high and gusts of up to eighteen knots. 
“In the last six months, Somali pirates attacked more vessels than ever before and 
they’re taking higher risks,” said International Maritime Bureau Director Pottengal Mukundan.  
“This June, for the first time, pirates fired on ships in rough seas in the Indian Ocean during the 
monsoon season.  In the past, they would have stayed away in such difficult conditions.” He 







C.	   TRENDS AND CHARACTERISTICS 
1.	   Trends of Piracy Tactics 
  a.	  	  	  Conditions in Somalia: Early History 
Piracy off the coast of Somalia is a result of regional instability and the lack of rule of 
law in Somalia (U. N. Council 2010).  In January 1991, President Siad Berre was forced out of 
the capital and the government collapsed.  The fall of the government led to widespread pov-
erty and the split of the nation into autonomous clan-led regions.  The result of the collapse of 
the central controlling authority of the nation began a slide into poverty for the people, lack of 
employment, and damage to the fishing trade by illegal fishing and hazardous dumping (Expert 
Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast 2008).  As the piracy increased, the fishing trade became 
more dangerous. Pollution from illegal dumping and over-fishing by foreigners has resulted in 
decreased yields for Somali fisherman.  This forced an increase in piracy because piracy was 
seen by many fishermen as the only option for survival.  The choice available to people who 
previously relied on fishing for their livelihood was between living in destitution, afraid of the 














Figure 3.  “Piracy Ports.” (Dahl 2011). 
By the middle of the previous decade, there were five main piracy ports in Somalia; 
Eyl, Hobyo, Hardheere and Caluula (Carafano and Rodeback 2011).  These ports are well or-
ganized, well-armed and protected from local authorities.  Currently, piracy in Somalia is cen-
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tered in the Puntland region.  It is suspected that piracy has penetrated the local government 
where officials are suspected of direct involvement in piracy activities (Expert Group on Piracy 
off the Somali Coast 2008). 
 
 
Figure 4. “Timeline of Piracy in HOA AOR.” (Carafano and Rodeback 2011.) 
  b.    Evalutation of Somali Pirate Tactics 
In the 1990s, piracy off the shore of Somalia was limited to small groups of young men 
engaging in armed robbery of fishing boats and other small craft.  They employed small skiffs 
with outboard motors and patrolled the littoral areas.  Local fishermen would supply their fish-
ing skiffs in exchange for payments that far exceeded what they could make fishing.  As the 
turn of the century approached, these groups became better tied together and developed into a 
clan-controlled group that was better organized and effective.  By 2005, the HOA region be-
came one of the most dangerous pirate hotspots in the world.  This was due in part to the in-
creasing local organization of pirates as well as the local crackdown in the South China Sea 





Figure 5. “Pirate Skiff.” 
In the early 2000s, the pirates off the coast of Somalia began to hijack larger ships, as 
well as fishing vessels and private yachts.  The hijacked ships are taken to various pirate ports 
on the coast of Somalia, depending on the origin of the pirate clan.  Ransoms for the crew, ship 
and cargo would be negotiated with the help of the clan elders.  Their tactic was to launch from 
beaches in twenty foot long pirate skiffs, idle off shore up to fifty nm, and wait for a target to 
cross their path (Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast 2008).  These skiffs could move 
as fast as thirty knots powered by eighty-five horsepower outboard motors.  They targeted slow 
moving vessels and those with a low freeboard. 
By 2008, there were significant attacks resulting in a change in commercial shipping 
tactics.  Commercial ships avoided the region of Somalia and moved further out to sea as seen 
in Figure 6, “Activity Trend 2007-2010.”  The Somali pirates responded by adjusting their area 
of patrol.  The pirates moved their attacks to the Gulf of Aden where there is high commercial 




Figure 6.  “Activity Trend 2007-2010.” (Carafano and Rodeback 2011). In 2008, pirates moved 
operations from the coast of Somalia to the Gulf of Aden. By 2010, the pirates moved from the 
Gulf of Aden further off the coast of Somalia. 
Their tactics remained much the same as the previous year.  The pirates would wait for 
a target and then chase them in a small craft equipped with an outboard motor.  If a ship is suc-
cessfully captured, the pirates take the vessel to one of the pirate ports and demand ransom for 
the crew, ship, and cargo. 
As the international community increased the protection of commercial shipping in the 
Gulf of Aden in 2009, the Somali pirates again moved out to sea.  Some of the captured ships 
would be used as mother ships to tow the skiffs up to 300nm off shore.  The motherships 
would move into the shipping lanes and search for targets.  Once one was found, the skiffs 
would be launched and several would swarm the target.  Upon reaching the target, seven to ten 
pirates would board the ship using ladders and grappling hooks. 
In response to this change in tactics, the international community published a best prac-
tices report (The UK Maritime Trade 2011) to deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the 
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coast of Somalia.  The commercial ships also employed passive methods to escape during at-
tacks.  One of the best methods was to keep a watch, and when a potential threat was spotted, 
increase speed and veer away.   Pirates adapted their tactics by employing larger 150 horse-
power engines on their skiffs (Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast 2008). 
 
 
Figure 7. “Pirate attacks in the HOA AOR moved from the Gulf of Aden to off the Somalia 
coast.” Data compiled from the following sources:  (U. N. Council 2010) (U. S. Council, 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1846 2008) (U. S. Council, Somalia pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1872 2009) (ICC-International Maritime Bureau 2010) (Major 
Dennis w. Sampson 2009) (Ploch, et al. 2011) (UNODC 2010) 
In 2010, the pirate activity moved further out into the Indian Ocean, as far as 1000 nm.  
Pirate attacks are more widespread and cover a larger area when compared to previous years, 
as seen in Figure 7. This was achievable by converting large merchant vessels into “mother 
ships.”  With the increase in passive deterrents to boarding and the high speed run to escape 
pursuit, the pirates have used small arms fire and rocket propelled grenades in an attempt to 
intimidate the masters of vessels into stopping and once boarded, to enter the onboard citadel 
(Operations August 2011).   To facilitate locating vessels out at sea, the pirates became more 
sophisticated by employing global positioning system equipment and began monitoring ship 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals to find prey (Expert Group on Piracy off the 
Somali Coast 2008). 
Currently, the pirates are increasing attacks up to 1000 nm into the Arabian Sea and the 
Indian Ocean.  Starting in 2009, the international community began an anti-piracy operation 
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called Task Force 151.  This task force is sanctioned to patrol the Gulf of Aden and the east 
coast of Somalia to render aid to ships in distress from attacks. 
 
Figure 8. “Pirate Attacks per Year.” Successes per attempted piracy events in the HOA AOR 
by year (Ploch, et al. 2011) (Carafano and Rodeback 2011) (UNODC 2010) 
 
 
Table 3. “Piracy Activity in Area of Interest by Year.” Piracy events in the HOA AOR (Ploch, 
et al. 2011) (Carafano and Rodeback 2011) (UNODC 2010). Percent success by pirates has 
been reduced through intervention even with an increase in frequency of attacks, but more can 
be done. 
The creation of taskforce 151 has resulted in the incarceration of over 600 suspected 
and convicted pirates (U. N. Council 2010).  Prior to 2009, there was a general “catch and re-
lease” approach to piracy.  In response to the international practice, pirates have used more ag-
gressive tactics and even murdered hostages.  Al Shabaab, a group some believe to be a terror-
ist movement, has been reported to have regional ties to the pirate groups in Somalia. Alleged-
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Gulf	  of	  Aden 10 13 92 117 53
Somalia 10 31 19 80 139
Somalia/GoA	  Attacks 20 44 111 217 192
Somalia/GoA	  Hijackings 12 27 42 47 64
PERCENT	  SUCCESS 60% 61% 38% 22% 33%
TOTAL	  WORLD	  WIDE 239 264 293 410 445
PIRACY	  ACTIVITY	  IN	  AREA	  OF	  INTEREST	  BY	  YEAR
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ly, some pirate groups approached Al Shabaab for combat training, following a defeat by 
French marines (Carafano and Rodeback 2011). 
2.   Characteristics of the Pirate Mothership 
Modern piracy has adapted to the constrained range of skiffs by commandeering larger 
ships with range and supply capacity to continue their hostage and cargo ransom operations in 
blue water (Mwangura 2010).  The larger and slower mother ships serve as multipurpose ves-
sels.  The first purpose is to get pirate personnel into deeper blue waters and wait for other 
ships. The larger ships generally can carry more personnel and supplies allowing pirates to stay 
longer at sea waiting for potential victims.  In addition to the basic supplies (such as food and 
water), the mother ships also carry weapons, hook ladders and grappling hooks for the attack 
missions.  (MSCHOA 2011) The second purpose of a mother ship is to serve as the command 
ship center for coordinating pirate attacks (MSCHOA 2011).  Attacks generally involve 
launching smaller skiffs from the mothership to their target. The third purpose is to carry or 
tow the smaller skiffs out to sea for launching coordinated attacks on merchant ships (NATO 
January 2006). 
The pirate motherships come in a variety of sizes (NATO January 2006). Depending on 
what they can commandeer, the mothership may vary from a deep sea fishing vessel to a vessel 












Figure 10. “Commandeered Tanker Converted to Mothership with Skiffs on Deck.”  (NATO 
January 2006). Using these large vessels as floating bases, coordinated attacks can be launched 




II.	   NEEDS ANALYSIS  
This project focuses on providing a cost effective solution set for improving the ability 
to identify and track pirates as well as dissemination of information to commercial vessels.  
The HOA AOR necessitates ISR capability that can cover hundreds of thousands of square 
miles of ocean.  Fortunately, the Department of Defense (DoD) has many of the necessary 
tools available to take on this challenge.  The analysis performed addresses capability gaps and 
concept of operations gaps identified during research and interviews with stakeholders as well 
as surveys from UAS operators from the HOA AOR. The Alexander Kossiakoff and William 
Sweet system engineering process was applied and a problem statement and set of user needs 
were developed (Kossiakoff and Sweet 2003). 
A.	  	  	  	  	  	  PROBLEM STATEMENT  
A near term solution was desired by stakeholders until planned maritime UAS ISR pro-
grams, such as the BAMS program, reach initial operational capability.  The resulting capabil-
ity improvement concept presented in this paper augments and supplements the current com-
mercial and coalition maritime situation awareness needs by filling the capability gap of persis-
tent counter-piracy ISR.  Initial research and stakeholder meetings resulted in the following 
refined problem statement: 
Commercial ships are beset by pirates extending from the Suez 
Canal & Arabian Sea in the North to 78⁰ East and 10⁰ South in the 
Indian Ocean.  Coalition forces need to locate and apprehend pi-
rates prior to their engagement of commercial vessels in this vast 
area of operations. Coalition forces need an ISR capability to iden-
tify, characterize, track and support piracy interdiction operations 
over extended durations and distances. 
B.	  	  	  	  	  	  RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The following research questions were addressed for this project: 
• What capability gaps need to be addressed with respect to countering the pirate 
application of mother ships? 
• Can formation and application of a system or family of systems comprised of 
existing or near term Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) as-
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sets meet stakeholders’ needs in countermining the pirate application of mother 
ships? 
• What characteristics, signatures and patterns mark a pirate mother ship? 
• What sensor payload requirements are needed to exploit the characteristics, sig-
natures and patterns of pirate mother ships? 
C.	   	  	  CAPABILITY GAPS  
Since the 1990s piracy has been ongoing and international efforts have been pursued to 
halt the rising trend of piracy in the HOA AOR, and all of them have met with marginal 
success.  The present international effort is Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, a coalition effort 
of the Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander/Commander US Naval Forces 
Central Command. CTF 151 maintains a multinational, multi-ship presence in the Gulf of 
Aden, Bab el Mandab, Red Sea, and the Somali Basin.  While CTF 151 is well organized, its 
effectiveness is limited by the resources on hand to carry out operations.  Each warship is 
limited by the range of its sensors and the reach of its helicopters.  In 2008, the Suez Canal 
Authority reported 22,000 transits.  The assets needed to provide protective escort for each 
vessel transiting the AOR are simply not available.  Warships are also limited by the time lapse 
between receiving the calls for assistance by merchants under attack and their arrival as well as 
by the difficulty discerning pirates from fishing and coastal traffic.   Pirates are not readily 
identifiable as pirates unless a weapon is brandished.  Until that moment, they are regarded as 
fishermen.  While airborne assets can travel over the HOAAOR expeditiously, the limitations 
on airborne search capabilities have been defined by the airborne assets and sensor packages.  
For example the P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft ETOS is three hours (Military P-3 2011) 
and the SH-60B ETOS is three to four hours (Leoni 2011).  Also, these two assets have 
advanced surface search sensor suites, but most Coalition member air assets do not.  AIS is an 
important tool to support identification and sorting out surface contacts.  Identifying the 
remaining contacts depends on the limited number of assets in the area and their sensor suite 
capability.  As stated above, most Coalition members do not have the appropriate sensor suite 
capabilities and the numbers are insufficient to efficiently deter piracy activities in the HOA 
(Abgar 2010) (U. N. Council 2010).  Survey results of operaters indicated that a shortfall of 
ISR assets was available in the region and that a primary concern to effectively conducting 
counter piracy operations was a lack of maritime surface radar capability. 
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D.	   LIST OF ASSUMPTIONS	  
Assumptions for this project are based on the available resources and project scope. 
• Assumption 1 - All pirate activities operate in a sea state of four or fewer. 
• Assumption 2 - Shore and Sea-Based ISR assets are options. 
• Assumption 3 - All analysis occurs off-board of the ISR platform. 
• Assumption 4 - The project scope is limited to detecting, locating, classifying, identi-
fying, tracking, and reporting on pirate activities only. 
• Assumption 5 - The project scope is limited to the HOA AOR only and does not pro-
vide monitoring outside the designated area. 
• Assumption 6 - Systems must be available by end of calendar year 2012. 
E.	   REQUIREMENTS CAPABILITIES 
 The fishbone diagram shown in Figure 11, “Contributing Factors for Successful Pirate 
Attacks” succinctly captures many aspects of the piracy challenge in the HOA AOR on which 
this project is focused. Most importantly, it shows the expansive area of operations, limited in-
telligence, and short response opportunities.  Commercial vessel vulnerabilities are of interest 


















Dynamic	  Threat,	  Old	  Intel
Insufficient	  Intel	  Coverage	  of	  Area
Distant	  	  War-­‐Ships
Threat	  Identification
Unable	  to	  provide	  active	  intel-­‐based	  avoidance
Maneuvering	  information
Ineffective	  Use	  of	  Warships
Inefective	  Use	  of	  Air	  Assetts
Ineffective	  Use	  of	  Space	  Assetts
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Early fact finding indicates that successful identification of pirates prior to conducting opera-
tions against a vessel should be a focus area.  Response times of military ships after a vessel 
has signaled an attack are almost never less than the time required for pirates to seize a vessel.  
This is a function of the vast area the HOA AOR and limited resources of Coalition Forces. 
The piracy threat zone, roughly 2.5 million square miles, sets the stage for a high en-
durance vehicle requirement.  It also drives the need for high scan rates with wide angle or 
field of regard sensor suites.  While the sensors payloads must support the scan rates of wide 
field, there must also be the ability to address the issues identified in the intelligence branch of 
the fishbone diagram.  A capability must exist to distinguish friend from foe, fisherman from 
pirate, and mother ship from dhow or freighter.  These challenges are diametrically opposed, 
with both the need for wide area scanning and focused detailed assessment.  The short response 
window highlights the criticality of time and the constraints it imposes.  This, coupled with the 
large area of operations, makes it clear that once an attack commences, it is most likely too late 
for naval forces to interdict the pirate ship.  The time constraint indicates that a necessary ca-
pability is to provide useful information prior to the commencement of an attack. 
The capabilities needed based on research and the initial problem statements are stated 
in Table 4, “Statements of User Needs.”  An effective and efficient Concept of Operations em-
ploying an existing system must deliver capabilities to fulfill the user needs. 
 
Table 4. “Statements of User Needs.” 
Refined Need:
Detect & Locate Mother Ship
{Coalition Forces need to detect & locate Pirate Mother 
Ships prior to their engagement of commercial vessels}
Refined Need:
Classify Identify Track
{Coalition forces need to classify, identify, and track Pirate 




{Communicate with Command and Control}
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F.	   MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE 
Each one of the operational needs have associated MOE parameters.  This project as-
sesses the effectiveness of using UASs for deployment to the HOA AOR to conduct operations 
described in the operational architecture description.  The MOEs provide a basis for moving 
forward into the concept exploration phase where several options or UAS alternatives are ex-





Figure 12.   “Needs Mapped to Measures of Effectiveness.” 
A stakeholder need prioritization scheme was used to determine the importance of each of the 
MOE. MOE are mapped to MOP by using a set of QFD matrices. Table 5 summarizes the 




Table 5. “Measures of Performance and Effectiveness.” 
  
Measure	  of	  Effectiveness	  
(MOE)
Measure	  of	  Performance	  
(MOP) Threshold Objective
Detection	  of	  potential	  
pirate	  mother	  ships
Detection	  a	  target	  at	  
25m^2	  radar	  cross	  
section,	  20kft	  above	  
MSL	  minimum,	  at	  level	  
flight	  attitude-­‐360	  
degrees
80	  nmi 200	  nmi
Locate	  pirate	  mother	  
ships
Locate:	  at25m^2	  radar	  
cross	  section,	  20kft	  
above	  MSL-­‐	  minimum,	  
at	  level	  flight	  attitude-­‐
360	  degrees,	  Radial	  
Position











at	  20Ft	  above	  MSL,	  360	  
degrees,	  25m^2	  RCS
150	  Contacts 200	  Contacts
Classification	  &	  
Identification
IR	  and	  visual	  imagery	  at	  
20,000	  ft,	  clear	  day
NIIRS	  7 NIIRS	  8
Airspeed 80	  Knots 200	  Knots
Endurance	  at	  radius	  of	  
600	  nmi	  (time	  on	  
station)




III.	  CONCEPT EXPLORATION 
A.     INITIAL CONCEPT WORK 
             Initial research conducted during the needs analysis phase of the project resulted in the 
PMSW&RS operational concept to employ UAS off the Horn of Africa.  The UAS would be 
used to conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions in order to provide ad-
vanced warning to commercial ships and support maritime domain situational awareness.   The 
operation is broken down into two primary mission areas, Figure 13 “Activity Mapping to Pri-
mary Mission Area.”  Mission Area 1 is associated with broad area detection, location, com-
munication and data relay, as well as broad area tracking functions.  Mission Area 2 is associ-
ated with classification and identification functions.  Two concepts were examined with alloca-
tion of mission areas being the primary difference. 
 
















Figure 14. “Concept I.” 
1.	   Concept I 
   UASs are deployed from the Horn of Africa area airfields (in this concept graphic, 
Africa) which proceed to an area of interest designated by operational commanders.  Upon ar-
riving in the area of operations, the UAS begins to conduct broad area detection and location 
functions.  The Mission Area 1 UAS is equipped with an AIS receiver and utilizes onboard 
systems to filter out targets that are not of interest.  The Mission Area 1 UAS has the ability to 
support communications and data relay so as to facilitate communications over V/UHF with 
C2.  In addition, the UAS supports data relay for command and control of smaller UASs.  Up-
on detection and location of targets of interest, a Mission Area 2 UAS is dispatched to conduct 
classification and identification activities.   The Mission Area 2 UAS would be a smaller ship-
based UAS with electro-optical camera to provide imagery for classification and identification.  




Figure 15. “Concept II.” 
2.	   Concept II 
A medium altitude UAS performs operations for both Mission Area 1 and Mission Area 2 
from a land base.   Analysis of this concept focused on the benefits of increased airspeed as 
well as the sensor capabilities available in land based UASs.  Specific consideration was given 
to the capabilities offered by the Electro-Optical/Infrared sensors found on the larger UASs to 




B.     CONCEPT REVIEW  
Both of the concepts outlined above were shared with stakeholders and the primary 
concerns expressed revolved around Concept I and the availability of the ship-based UAS.   
The following concerns were raised by stakeholders: 
• Many of the ship based UASs operated today are “pay for service” agreements in which 
contractor teams deploy aboard U.S. Navy Ships. 
• Concept I Concept of Operations would involve the U.S. ship remaining in a single, 
central area of operations and preclude it from conducting other missions in order to ef-
fectively support the concept. 
• Many ships would lose capability in other war fighting domains to support piracy oper-
ations. 
• The opportunity cost of allocating an expensive naval vessel. 
• Communications relay and the danger that the communications relay and link chain 
could be compromised. 
There were two primary concerns on Concept II, and both were common with Concept I: 
• Lack of locations for forward operating bases 
• Proximity to the HOA AOR area of interest. 
While the challenges associated with Concept II are not insignificant, research indicates that 
they can be overcome with existing UAS platforms.  Concept I presents a far more complicated 
and more costly effort.  The smaller UASs are significantly cheaper, but the allocation of the 
naval vessel with its crew outweighs the savings of the smaller vessel.  Concept II offers the 
best basis for a formulation of successful operational concept.  Further, interviews with experts 
indicated that the EO/IR pod found on several current land-based UASs has the capability to 
support classification and identification at altitudes in excess of twenty thousand feet above 
mean sea level. 
 Interviews with Navy Reaper operators provided an example of successful operations 
of land-based UASs from the Seychelles in support of counter piracy operations.  Further re-
search has identified two other potential forward operating bases, Fujairah (FJR), United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) and Malè, Maldives (Figure 16, “UAS FOBs.”)   The potential candidates 
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have locations within a 600 mile radius of the areas of interest in the HOA AOR, a distance 




800 Nautical Miles by




Figure 16.  “UAS FOBs.” Potential UAS Forward Operating Bases: Fujairah UAE, Male, Mal-












C.	   PMSW&RS CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS	  
The refined operational concept is presented in the OV-1 (Figure 17, “OV-1).  The con-
cept relies on a land-based UAS approach utilizing forward operating bases.  Land-based 
UASs are deployed from HOA AOR area airfields and proceed to an area of interest designated 
by operational commanders.  Upon arriving in the area of operations, the UAS will begin to 
conduct the mission area activities previously described. 
 





D.	   ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS	  
The operational architecture of the PMSW&RS has been developed after the careful 
consideration of user needs, problem space, capability gaps, market analysis, environmental 
analysis, and stakeholder surveys.  Operational interfaces or nodes required to complete the 
antipiracy mission are identified in Figure 18, “Operational Nodes Diagram” and are described 




Figure18.  “Operational Nodes Diagram.” 
1. Operational Nodes 
a.  Communications Satellite 
Satellite coverage provides the vital capability for Beyond Line of Sight communica-
tions.  The continuous communications coverage would provide UAS control, voice, data and 
video used to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa and surrounding areas. 
  b.    GPS Satellite Analysis 
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Geospatial information is critical to locating not only the pirate ships but also for com-
mand and control of the vehicle beyond the horizon. 
  c.    Commerical Vessel Analysis 
Commercial ships greater than 300 tons should be broadcasting AIS in accordance with 
international guidance, and the UAS system will receive AIS data broadcasted from the ship. 
  d.	  	  	  	  Command and Control Analysis 
Command and Control (C2) is depicted separate from the unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV).  This helps in the modeling effort to show communications between the UAV and C2.  
  e.    Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
The UAV is the platform for delivering sensor capabilities, intelligence collection and 
beyond-line-of-sight communications. The UAV utilizes onboard systems to filter contacts that 
are not of interest.  The UAV will receive mission data and send sensor data from command 
and control.  Upon detection and location of contacts of interest, classification and identifica-
tion activities are performed.  Command and control will verify the classification of vessels 
that are tagged as potential pirates by the UAS.   The UAV will collect speed, heading and co-
ordinate information on vessels identified as threats. 
2.	   Operational Activities 
The operational activity model (Figure 19, “UAS Operational Activity Model, Orthog-
onal View”) shows the operational activities of the architecture for the counter-piracy opera-
tion.  It consists of six operational activities for the UAS that include detect, locate, classify, 
identify, track and transmit data.  It is a trace-or-sequence diagram that captures the messages 
and general timing of communications and events that would occur during the counter piracy 
mission. 
In this sequence, a UAS platform is deployed to an operational area to conduct piracy 
detection operations.  Early messages and data transfers highlight the importance of the com-
munications and GPS satellite infrastructure while the latter or lower portion of the sequence 
diagram captures the details of the on-scene mission.  The Satellite link is clearly the critical 
node in this system, as all operational activities depend on a continued link.  AIS is a funda-
mental element in this concept as it is a primary filter utility.  The first decision point in Figure 














Figure 21. “OV-6c Event Trace Descriptions.” 
In this sequence diagram, in order for useful data to be collected on radar contacts, the current 
and correct coordinate location of the UAV must be determined and updated continuously.  
Detection of a contact of interest triggers the classification tasking and identification activities.  
Imagery data supports classification and identification activities.  Classification of a probable 
pirate ship results identity activities.  Maritime V/UHF from the UAS carries the broadcast 
warning.  A return to base message from C2 signifies the completion of operations.  When the 
UAV is within LOS of its landing field, then LOS communications will be established with the 
UAS for landing. 
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3.	   Concept Exploration and Tradeoffs 
Early evaluation of simulation factors (Appendix F: “Modelling Using Excel Soft-
ware”) indicated time, specifically the short time between when the pirate enters the HOA 
AOR and when the pirate mother ship is able to use radar or AIS to detect and locate a target 
commercial vessel is important.  The system has to detect potential threats and identify friend 
or foe before this point to allow time for reaching a decision about information transmission 
and time needed for merchant vessels to react. 
On the principle that it is desirable that a pirate ship not be allowed to sight a  commer-
cial vessel before C2  sends out a message warning of its presence, our objective is to enable 




Figure 22.  “Line of Sight Equation.” 
Pirate motherships would be using either an onboard AIS system or radar system that 
would only be able to detect targets at a maximum range of their radar's line of sight range 
from its antenna located on its mast to a merchant ship’s antenna on its mast (Figure 22, “Line 
of Sight Equation,”(Aviation Department NAVAIR-4.5 1999)).  A conservative approach was 
taken by using a mothership with an approximate hull height of 60 ft and a mast of 150 ft to 
detect similarly sized commercial ships transmitting AIS at a maximum range of 103 miles. 
A successful system needs to detect at least 80% of all pirate mother ships (MOE, De-
tection) and warn commercial vessels before they are within the 103 mile range. Earlier detec-
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tion allows for more time to perform classification and identification functions and should be 
considered when developing program technical performance measures. 
UASs have defined speeds and sensor fields of view that determine how often a specif-
ic area is scanned.  Scanning needs to be frequent enough to detect threats when they cross into 
the AOI. If the area is not scanned frequently enough, the probability of system success will 
fall below the threshold level of detection. 
Requirement tradeoffs and evaluations were necessary to determine how many UASs 
will be essential to yield the desired detection rate.  A key parameter necessary to begin analy-
sis was determination of control zone size and configuration.  Examination started with analy-
sis of plots of pirate attack density found on multiple websites, to include the website for Mari-
time Security Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) (MSCHOA 2011) (Figure 11, “Contributing Factors 
for Successful Pirate Attacks”).  Results of zone analysis focused on protecting sea lanes in 
order to maximize effectiveness.  Zone determination information can be found in Appendix F, 
“Modelling Using Excel Software.”  Zone analysis was done using a Microsoft Excel model.  
The output of the model is shown in Figure 38, “Sensitivity Analysis (Detection Accuracy 
Range,” with the percentage of motherships that are successfully detected before they reach the 






Figure 23.  “UAS Early Identification & Warning.” 
As the required warning distance is increased, the time allowed for each Medium Alti-
tude UAS to scan, identify, and track each ship is reduced. When pirate ships start attacking at 
a faster rate than there are UASs available to complete their tasks, the successful detection rate 
will be reduced.   The analysis indicates that at least two medium altitude UASs are required 
given the constraints of readily available military off-the-shelf hardware performance parame-
ters.  If a single UAS is used, then all of the contacts detected cannot be identified because the 
entire area of interest cannot be successfully covered in a reasonable time.  This is again due to 
the situation where a pirate enters the area of interest and a single UAS cannot re-scan areas 
before a pirate makes it to the minimum distance required to warn the commercial ships.    Two 
or more UASs give sufficient coverage of the entire area of interest, so no pirate goes unidenti-
fied prior to reaching the minimum distance that would allow the commercial ship to evade 
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attack.  Further, the results indicate that 120 nautical miles warning time can reasonably be 
achieved when using only two UASs and meeting the threshold of 80% detection success. 
4.	   Sensitivity Analysis 
To determine which system requirements have the biggest impact on the overall System 
MOE, successful detection rate, a sensitivity analysis of the following factors was performed: 
• UAS Speed 
• UAS Endurance 
• UAS Radar Range 
 
Figure 24.“Sensitivity Analysis.” 
 
Using high, medium and low levels of each UAS requirement, it is apparent that the 
UAS speed has the highest impact to successful detection MOE, followed by the on-board ra-
dar range.  This is demonstrates the importance of quickly and repeatedly scanning the zone of 
interest for pirate ships before the pirate has time to travel to a merchant ship.  With greater 
speed, the UAS can traverse its flight path in a shorter time with a wider radar range, so the 
UAS would need to travel less distance to scan the entire zone. The sensitivity analysis results 
reinforce the simulation that the fastest UAS with the widest radar range outperformed all other 







E.	   MARKET SURVEY 
Market research was conducted over a six-month period, focused on existing technolo-
gies and application to the concepts.  The objective of the research was to identify systems 
which could remain on station in the HOA AOR for as long as possible and have the right ra-
dar and optical systems without exceeding the UAS’s payload weight limit. 
The most challenging aspects of the requirement set were the detection of sea surface 
vessels and the tracking of these contacts once found.  It appeared that there was a great 
amount of technology development underway for surface-to-air and surface-to-ground ISR.  
The most significant challenge for researched systems was finding and classifying small to 
medium sized vessels accurately (Shaver 2011). This shortfall in capability supports the con-
tinued tradeoffs between high altitude search and low altitude surveillance. 
1.	   Candidate Unmanned Aerial Systems 
Many UASs were investigated to find the right solution for the original and modified 
concepts.  The most capable UASs for this application were the Heron TP, Guardian and the 
LEMV systems.  These three UASs were used for the later portion of the system development 
and modeling. 
 
Table 6. “UAS Platforms Researched.” 
This refined list of systems included acceptable ISR capabilities for maritime surveil-
lance.  The maritime environment has unique ISR challenges due to the continuous motion of 
the background and the higher the sea state so the greater this challenge. 
 
 
System Name Type of UAV Developer Maturity 
Heron TP (EiTan) UAV* Long-Endurance Medium-High Altitude IAI / Malat 
First flight on 15 July 2006, 
Currently in Service 
MQ-9B Guardian UAV* 
(Variant of MQ-9 Reaper) 
Long-endurance, Medium-
High Altitude General Atomics 
Over-water developmental test 
February 2010 




Altitude Northrop-Grumman OT&E Scheduled early 2012 
MQ-4C BAMS UAS   
(Variant of Global Hawk) 




CDR on March 7, 2011, First 
flight Schedule. 2012, Op 
Capable Schedule. 2016 
MQ-9 Reaper long endurance, medium-to-high altitude General Atomics 
First flight on February 2001, 
Currently in Service 
Scan Eagle Mini UAV medium endurance, Low to medium-altitude Boeing Corp 
First delivery to US Navy in 
2005, Currently in Service 
MQ-8B Fire Scout Low endurance, Low to medium-altitude Northrop-Grumman 
First deployment aboard a US 
Navy ship December 2008, 
Currently in Service 
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a. 	  Maritime Radar Sensors 
Many types of sensor systems were researched to find the ones that would perform well 
enough on a sea surface environment.  The primary sensor systems of interest are: 
• Inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR)-maritime with Moving Target Indicator 
• Electro-Optical/Infrared Sensors 
• Signal Intelligence Suite 
The ISAR is preferred over the SAR radar for maritime imaging and target recognition.  
Not only is the target moving as it sails, but there are also movement characteristics produced 
by the motion of the ocean (ship pitching and rolling).  Using the ISAR radar also allows the 
achievement of image resolutions of a much bigger antenna.   The ISAR allows good image 
resolution at greater distances.  The payload restrictions of UASs and the nature of the targets 
that will be imaged in a sea environment make the ISAR a necessary component of any broad 
area maritime ISR system.  EO/IR for day and night imagery in support of classification and 
identification is critical for this mission.  SIGINT is an additional capability that while not crit-
ical to mission success would help support the full mission spectrum. 
 
Table 7. “Sensor Systems Researched.” 
2.	   Unsuitable Candidate Unmanned Air Vehicles 
There were a number of systems that were evaluated that did not meet the needs and 
requirements defined for our system.  Listed below are a few of those platforms and some of 





System Name Type of System Developer Maturity 
Vehicle And Dismount 
Exploitation Radar (VADER) SAR 
Northrop 
Grumman 
15 July 2008 First 
Flight 
EL/M-2022 Maritime Surveillance RADAR Elta Systems Mature 
MX-20 Airborne Electro Optic L-3 Technologies Mature 
SeaVueTM X-band Maritime surveillance Radar Raytheon 
Initial Flight Test 
in 2011 






Multispectral Targeting System 
B (MTS-B) 
Multispectral Targeting 




a.	   Scan Eagle 
 
Figure 25. “Scan Eagle Image.” 
The Scan Eagle is a small to medium altitude reconnaissance, surveillance and target 
acquisition UAS developed by Boeing, Inc., that entered service in 2004.  It uses a launch and 
recovery system that allows it to operate without the need for an airfield.  The payload includes 
a real time color electro-optical camera and an infrared camera for night operations.  It can 
track both stationary and moving targets due to it is built-in gimbaled system and can provide 





Table 8. “Scan Eagle Specifications.” 
In 2005, the system was modified for use on United States Navy high-speed vessels.  
The modification allowed the system to be ship-launched and recoverable, aided by an on-ship 
GPS beacon.  The system provides real time intelligence and situational awareness.  It can re-
main on station for up to 15 hours.  The aircraft has a payload bay that allows it to be config-
ured for unique operations.  The system can run autonomously to a location of interest or re-
ceive operator inputs using a GPS and onboard flight-control system.  The analysis of alterna-
tives pointed away from a high altitude scan – “identify and track” coupled with a low altitude 
identification/classification approach towards one where a medium altitude system would per-
form all system functions.  The departure from a high and low altitude concept led to the Scan 
Eagle being discounted as a viable solution (U.S. Air Force 2009). 
 
  
Scan Eagle Specification 
Power Plant: 3W 2-stroke piston engine; 1.5 horsepower 
Wingspan: 10.2 feet (3.1 meters) 
Length: 3.9 feet (1.19 meters) 
Weight: 39.7 lbs (18 kilograms) 
Speed: 55-80 mph 
Endurance: 20 + hours 
Operating    
Altitude: 
16,000 feet air ground level (4,876 meters) 
System Cost: approximately $3.2 million (2006 dollars) 





b.	   MQ-4C Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS 
 
 
Figure 26. “Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Image.” 
The BAMS UAS is based on the proven Global Hawk unmanned aircraft system specif-
ically modified for persistent maritime ISR.  It can operate twenty-four hours a day, seven days 
a week with an 80% ETOS.  It is designed to operate at an altitude of 40,000 feet above air 
traffic and weather.   It can operate up to 3,000 miles from its launch point and stay on station 
for 26 hours (Unmanned Editor 2011). 
It is equipped with various sensor systems, including a multi-function active sensor Ac-
tive Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) X-band radar that can detect and classify at long 
range.  It also uses the Multi-Spectral Targeting System-B (MTS-B) Electro-Optical and Infra-
Red (EO/IR) system, giving high-resolution images and video for target tracking.  It has an 
AIS system for monitoring transponders of maritime vessels for initial identification in high 
traffic areas. 
	  
Table 9. “MQ-4C BAMS Global Hawk Specifications.” 
 
MQ-4C BAMS Specifications 
Wingspan  130.9 ft (39.9 m) 
Length  47.6 ft (14.5 m) 
Height  15.4 ft (4.6 m) 
Gross Take-off Weight  32,250 lbs. (14,628 kg) 
Max. Internal Payload  3,200 lbs. (1,452 kg) 
Max. External Payload  2,400 lbs. (1,089 kg) 
Self-Deploy  8,200 nm (15,186 km) 
Max. Altitude 56,500 ft (17.22 km) 
Max. Velocity  331 knots True Air Speed (TAS) 




The BAMS UAS was not selected as a candidate vehicle for the system due to the cur-
rent state of maturity.  It was deemed that the risk was too great that it would not be operational 
within the requisite timeframe.  Another factor was the possible unavailability of the system 
once it was operational.  Research revealed that it would be highly unlikely to be able to pro-
cure the BAMS vehicle.  All the scheduled deliveries were allocated to different programs.  
The BAMS UAS is scheduled to be operation capable in 2016. (Unmanned Editor 2011) 
c.	   MQ-8B Fire Scout 
 
 
Figure 27. “Fire Scout Image.” 
The Fire Scout UAS is a rotary wing autonomous helicopter designed for vertical take-
off and landing allowing it to provide situational awareness and targeting support in combat.  
In 2001, the Fire Scout program was cancelled by the United States Navy because it did not 
meet their needs.  The system was improved under a United States Army contract leading to 
the MQ-8B configuration with enhanced capabilities.  Improvements allowed the Fire Scout to 
perform its role in the air, on land and at sea.  In 2006, the MQ-8B was the first autonomous 
helicopter to land on a moving ship at sea as part of its operational requirements. The system 
now can integrate various modular payloads to include Tactical Synthetic Aperture Radar 
(TSAR) with moving target indicator, multispectral sensor and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) 
can be added for beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) targeting.  This system was discounted early on 




Table 10.“MQ-8B Fire Scout Specifications.” (Northrop-Grumman 2011) 
3.	   Suitable Candidate Unmanned Air Vehicles 
Three platforms were selected for the analysis of alternatives.  The platform selection 
was based on the medium altitude and high endurance operational concept. There were a num-
ber of UASs that did meet the needs and requirements of the project.  To meet the mission re-
quirements, the vehicle needed an effective sensor suite, long endurance and ability to provide 
continuous monitoring to find and track potential threats.  The vehicle also needed to have ad-
equate loitering speed to cover the area under patrol.  Too long between scanning of any area 









MQ-8B Fire Scout Specifications 
Power Plant Rolls-Royce/Allison 250-C20W turbo shaft; 310 
kW (420 shp) 
Length 23.95 ft 
Rotor Diameter 27.5 ft 
Height 9.71 ft 
Empty Weight 2,073 lbs. 
Gross takeoff Weight 500 – 3,150  lbs. 
Payload weight 700 lbs. 
Service Ceiling 20,000 ft 
Max. Speed 115 knots 
Cruise Speed 110 Knots 
Combat Radius 110 nm 
Endurance 8 hrs. 




 a.	   Heron TP 
 
 
Figure 28. “Heron TP Image.” 
The Heron TP, Figure 28 and Table 11, is a high-altitude reconnaissance and surveil-
lance UAS developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI).  Entering service in 2008, it is the 
second generation vehicle produced for the Israel Air Force, the Indian Ministry of Defense 
and the Turkish Air Force.  It has a wingspan of twenty six meters, making it one of the largest 
UASs.  It has an operating ceiling of 45,000 feet and can loiter at the area of interest for up to 




Table 11. “IAI Heron TP Specifications.” 
The Heron TP has a direct line-of-site data link system as well as an airborne data relay for be-
yond line-of-sight operations using SATCOM.  This UAS has the capability to operate day or 
night and in all weather conditions.  Available payloads include EO/IR/LRF, SAR, a medium 
power RADAR (MPR), ELINT, and COMINT packages for beyond line of site real time data 
















Heron TP Specifications 
Engine Turbo-Prop 
Power 1,200 hp 
Propeller diameter 9.2 ft 
Max Take-off weight 10,230 lbs. 
Max. Payload capacity 2200 lbs. 
Max. Fuel capacity 3850 lbs. 
Total length 46 ft 
Wing span 85.3 ft 
Total height 10.8 ft 
TO Distance <3281 ft 
Maximum altitude > 45,000 ft 
Operational Altitude > 41,000 ft 
Time of climb to OA < 40 min. 
Max. payload weight > 990 lbs. 
Max. speed 220 ktas at 45  Kft 
Cruise speed at OA 180 to 200 ktas 
Total mission time >24 h 
Loiter time at 550 NM > 16 h 




 b.	   Long Endurance Mult-Intelligence Vehicle (LEMV) 
 
 
Figure 29. “LEMV Image.” 
The LEMV, Figure 29 and Table 12, is a high altitude very long endurance ISR system 
that employs a hybrid air vehicle (HAV) configuration.  It is designed to operate runway 
independent due to its short runway launch capability with excellent ground stability.  It uses 
aerodynamic lift during takeoff and then uses helium during flight.  The LEMV is made of a 
combination of  Vectran, Kevlar and Mylar giving it the capability to withstand and survive 
small arms fire. 
Table 12. “LEMV Characteristics.” 
The LEMV is designed to utilize twelve to twenty-four forward-deployed crew mem-
bers in the support of eighteen vehicles.  The vehicle will be able to stay on station for twenty-
 
LEMV Characteristics 
Power Plant: four diesel engines and a vector vane technology 
Fuel Capacity 18,000 lbs. 
Fuel Consumption 10X less than comparable capability vehicles 
Length: 302 feet 
Height 84 feet 
Max Speed: 80 kts 
Loiter Speed 30 kts 
Endurance: 21 Days 
Operating Altitude: > 22,000 ft. MSL 
Range: 1,500nm – 2,400nm 
Payload Volume < 2,700 cu ft 
Max Payload Capacity 15,000 lbs. 
ISR Payload: Radar, SIGINT, Full Motion Video, LOS/BLOS    
COMM Relay 
Table 1. LEMV Characteristics 
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one continuous days with twenty-four hours of uninterrupted eyes-on-target.  Northrop-
Grumman used an open architecture design allowing for multiple configurations and the ability 
to incorporate future technologies (Northrop Grumman's LEMV Program Completes Three 
Major Milestones 2010).  Operational costs will be low with a fuel cost of approximately 
$11,000 per twenty-one day deployment.  The Northrop-Grumman LEMV is currently under 
development with a final acceptance test scheduled for December 2011.  The vehicle will un-
dergo a demonstration in an operational environment in early 2012. 
The LEMV has all of the characteristics to meet the maritime ISR needs.  Its unique 
twenty-one day continuous scan time-on-station provides a high probability of locating pirates 
in the area of interest (Northrop-Grumman 2011). 
 c.	   MQ-9B Guardian 
 
Figure 30. “MQ-9 Guardian Image.” 
The General Atomics MQ-9B Guardian UAS, Figure 30 and Table 13, is a maritime 
variant of the proven Predator B drone.  The Predator B modifications include changes to the 
structure, avionics and incorporated communications enhancements.  This UAS was designed 
for use by the United States Customs and Border Protection and the United States Coast Guard 
for maritime ISR for the detection of threats. 
MQ-9B Guardian is equipped with the Raytheon AN/ASS-52 Multi-Spectral Targeting 
System (MTS-B).  The MTS-B sensor uses the three-to-five micron infrared band that assists 
in penetrating sea haze and other obscurants giving the system the ability to read the letters on 
the side of vessels.  The MQ-9B also has an electro-optical sensor for streaming video imagery 
that can distinguish a man sized target at seven miles distance.  The modification of the MQ-9 
system attaches a belly-mounted Raytheon AN/APS-134 SeaVueTM XMR multi-mode mari-
time search radar.  This modification aids in the classification of moving ships at a distance of 
47 
 
fifty miles away.  It is equipped with AIS and will interrogate cooperative surface ships to as-
sist in classification of threats (Global Security.Org 2011). 
 
Table 13. “MQ-9 Guardian Specifications.” (Global Security.Org 2011) 
 
 
General Atomic MQ-9 Guardian Characteristics  
Primary Function Unmanned Air Surveillance - Maritime 
Contractor General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.  
Power Plant Honeywell TPE331-10GD turboprop engine 
Thrust 900 shaft horsepower maximum 
Wingspan 66 feet (20.1 meters) 
Length 36 feet (11 meters)  
Height 12.5 feet (3.8 meters)  
Weight 4,900 pounds (2,223 kilograms) empty  
Maximum takeoff weight 10,500 pounds (4,760 kilograms)  
Fuel Capacity 4,000 pounds (602 gallons) 
Payload Capacity 3,750 pounds (1,701 kilograms)  
Speed  Cruise speed around 230 miles per hour (200 knots) 
Range 1,150 miles (1,000 nautical miles) 
Ceiling Up to 50,000 feet (15,240 meters)  
Crew (remote) Two (pilot and sensor operator)  
Unit Cost  $53.5 million (includes four aircraft with sensors) (fiscal 2006 dollars)  
Initial operating capability October 2007 




4.	   Payload Systems 












Figure 31. “Maritime Surveillance Radar System.” 
The EL/M-2022U, (Figure 31 and Table 14) is multi-role, multi-mode, airborne mari-
time surveillance radar.  It employs a Synthetic Aperture Radar and inverse synthetic aperture 
Radar (ISAR) for use with the Heron TP UAS.  ISAR is ideally suited or the imaging of mov-
ing targets in high seas.  The system has automatic tracking of moving targets at any speed.  It 
is capable of operation day or night and in all weather conditions. It is also capable of penetrat-





































 EL/M-2022 Maritime Patrol Radar Specifications 
Detection range up to 230 miles (EL/M-2022A) 
Track-while-scan up to 256 targets (EL/M-2055A, including IFF tracking) 
Operating 
Temperature -4 to +131F (EL/M-2022A) 
Altitude sea level to 30,000 ft (EL/M-2022A) 
Power 
115 V AC (EL/M-2022A, 3-




1,000 W (EL/M-2022U, 
vertical take-off/landing 
UAV); 2,000 W (EL/M-




110 lbs. (EL/M-2022U, 
vertical take-off/landing 
UAV); 165 lbs. (EL/M-
2022H); 251 lbs. (EL/M-
2022U, medium-altitude long-
endurance UAV); 198-220 lbs. 
(EL/M-2022A, approximate, 
configuration dependent, 




Northrop-Grumman had its first flight test in February, 2010.  For tracking, the system 
uses the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) NetTrack tool.  NetTrack is 
designed for reconnaissance, surveillance and tracking of ground targets and is able to detect 
people, animals, water craft and land vehicles.  The VADER system is comprised of a receiv-
er/exciter/processor unit mounted in the vehicle fuselage and an external pod mounted antenna 
unit.  The versatile radar system can track at varying ranges.  Although it is designed for a me-










 b.	   Wescam MX-Series 
Wescam, Figure 34 and Table 15, produced by L-3 Technologies, comes in 3 sizes in 
their MX series EO/ IR gimbaled imaging systems (MX-10, MX-15 and MX-20).  The MX-20 
is the largest of the MX series and can be configured with up to 6 sensors.  The unit has 24/7 
EO imaging and has enhanced night imaging with laser illumination.  The systems AVGT unit 
can combine video with geo-tracking, providing excellent target tracking.  The imaging resolu-
tion is 1080p and has 2 mega-pixel EO Zoom and spotter cameras (Communications, L3 
2011). 
 
MX	  -­‐20	  Specifications	  
High	  magnification	  thermal	  imager	  (standard)	   Gimbal	  and	  turret	  
Detector:	   Gen	  3	  InSb	  staring	  array	   Active	  gyro-­‐
stabilization:	  
5-­‐axis	  (3	  inner,	  2	  
outer)	  




Resolution:	   640	  ×	  512	   LoS	  jitter:	   <4	  µrad	  RMS	  
Fields-­‐of-­‐view	  
(h):	  
18.2°	  to	  0.24°	  in	  four	  stages	  
(720p	  and	  1,080p)	  
Slew	  rate:	   0-­‐1	  rad/s	  
Color	  daylight	  TV	  with	  zoom	  lens	  (standard)	   Azimuth	  range:	   360°	  continuous	  
Type:	   Color	  HD	   Elevation	  range:	   -­‐120	  to	  +90°	  
Resolution:	   2	  megapixels	   Power:	   320	  W	  (average);	  
1,000	  W	  (max)	  
Fields-­‐of-­‐view	  
(option	  A):	  





21.3°	  to	  1.83°	  (7200p);	  18.2°	  to	  
2.75°	  (1,080p)	  
Diameter:	   530	  mm	  
TV	  with	  step-­‐spotter	  lens	  (optional)	   Height:	   670	  mm	  
Type:	   Color	  HD	  or	  Monochrome	  HD	   Weight:	   84.1	  kg	  
Resolution:	   2	  megapixels	   	  
Fields-­‐of-­‐view:	   0.115°	  to	  0.61°	  (720p);	  0.17°	  to	  
0.92°	  (1,080p)	  in	  4-­‐steps	  







MX	  -­‐20	  Specifications	  
MX-­‐Day/Night	  Spotter{TM}	  with	  dual-­‐channel	  step-­‐
spotter	  (requires	  Color	  HD	  camera	  above)	  
Type:	   Diode	  (ANSI	  Class	  4)	  
Type:	   Charge-­‐multiplying	  CCD	  (mono-­‐
chrome)	  
Wavelength:	   860	  nm	  
Wavelength:	   450	  1	  1,000	  nm	  (selectable)	   Mode:	   Continuous,	  pulsed	  




Wide,	  narrow	  or	  ultra-­‐
narrow.	  (Matched	  to	  MX-­‐
Night	  Spotter).	  
Eye-­‐safe	  laser	  rangefinder	  (optional)	  
	   	  
Type:	   Er:	  glass	  (ANSI	  Class	  1)	  
	   	  
Wavelength:	   1.54	  µm	  
	   	  
Pulse	  rate:	   12	  ppm	  
	   	  
Range	  (typical):	   30	  km	  (50	  km	  range	  gate)	  
	   	  
Range	  resolution:	   ±5	  m	   	   	  




c.	   Multi-Spectral Tracking System (MTS-B) 
The AN/ASS-52 Multi-Spectral Tracking System (MTS-B), Figure 33 and Table 
15, (Jane's Intelligence 2011)  is a high altitude adapted MTS-A system and was specifi-
cally developed for use in the MQ-9 Reaper.  The system uses various sensor options in-
cluding EO TV, image intensified TV, a laser illuminator, a laser range finder, a spot 
tracker, image fusion and other avionics.  By combining these various sensors, it would 
generate an enhanced image and employ automatic image optimization techniques. 









AN/ASS-52 MTS-B Specifications 
Fields-of-view: 
Ultra-narrow IR:  0.23 0.31 
Ultra-narrow TV:  0.08 0.11 
Narrow IR/TV:  0.47 0.63 
Medium-narrow:  2.8 3.7 
Medium:  5.7 7.6 
Medium-wide:  17 22 
Wide:  34 45 
Electronic zoom:  2:1 and 4:1 (IR/TV in smallest FoVs) 
Gimbal angular coverage  
Azimuth:  360 continuous 
Elevation:  -135 to +40 
Slew rate:  2 radians/s 
Max Indicated Air Speed:  > 200 kt (370 km/hr; 230 mph) 
Automatic video tracking:  Centroid, area and feature 
Video outputs:  Digital, RS-170 (525-line) and others 
Interfaces:  MIL-STD-1553 data bus and/or discrete controls 
Power:  28 V DC 
Cooling:  Self-contained 
Environmental:  MIL-E0-5400 and MIL-STD-810 
Dimensions  
WRA-1 (turret) - diameter:  22 in 
WRA-2 (electronics unit)  
Length:  14.4 in 
Width:  4.9 in 
Height:  7.6 in 
Weights  
WRA-1 (turret):  230 lb. 





Figure 34. “Raytheon SeaVueTM.” The Raytheon SeaVueTM system is a lightweight 
modular X-band surveillance Radar package for a maritime environment. 
 
SeaVueTM incorporates a number of radar modes including Doppler beam sharp-
ening, SAR/ISAR, Search 1 and Search 2.  In Search 1 mode, the system is used to detect 
small targets in high sea states.  In Search 2 mode, the system is used for extended range 
detection when there are multiple potential targets.  The system can emulate a parabolic 
reflector, as well as a planar array, depending on the needed modes (Jane's Intelligence 
2011). 
 
Table 17. “Generic SeaVueTM Specifications.
	  Generic SeaVue{TM} Specifications 
Dimensions 
Transmitter Height 279 mm (10.98 in) 
Width 330 mm (12.99 in) 
Depth 498 mm (19.61 in) 
RESP: Height 257 mm (10.12 in) 
Width 391 mm (15.39 in) 
Depth 498 mm (19.61 mm) 
Weights 
Typical antenna 23 kg 
Transmitter 30 kg 
RESP 37 kg 
Performance 
Frequency 9.4-9.8 GHz 
Power output 8, 15 or 50 kW (peak) 
Detection range: Individual 
life raft 
67 n miles (124 km, 77 miles) 




IV.	  CONCEPT DEFINITION 
A. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
1.Modeling and Simulation Overview 
Modeling and simulation allows for the examination of system performance re-
quirements to aid in determining the overall system MOPs and gauging system develop-
ment. During needs and requirements decomposition, there were some unknowns crucial 
to the concept of operations development, which needed exploration to ensure proper re-
quirements definition in support of system objectives.   For the purpose of this project, a 
simulation model was created in Microsoft Excel to evaluate the tradeoff of system re-
quirements such as number of UASs, speed of UASs, UAS endurance time. Also includ-
ed are systems constraints and assumptions such as frequency of mother ship attacks on 
commercial vessels, speed of pirate vessels, and the minimum threshold time that allows 
successful evasive action by a commercial vessel.  The objective of the system is to suc-
cessfully detect, locate, classify and identify enemy mother ships with enough time to 
warn commercial vessels so they can avoid attack.  The model allows the adjustment of 
each parameter to determine the impact to the system’s successful detection capability 
and MOE for various possible configurations. 
Some of the inputs into the model included constants such as the probability of 
the detection system to detect various size targets.  Data was acquired through market 
analysis and interviews.  Other factors in the model were second order, based on model-
ing to meet objectives set forth in the MOEs. 
There was a need to determine the right size corridor to continue to facilitate easy 
and economical transport of supplies through the affected zone yet enable a support sys-
tem to be successful.  Because of the large number of variables between the possible 
components of the system, the modeling effort was needed to answer the proper scanning 
size for each system configuration.  MOPs for radar scanning parameters were developed 
using this Microsoft Excel modeling tool. 
2. Number of UASs Required to Cover Area of Interest 
The differences of performance (speed of UAS, number of UASs allotted, speed 
of target vessels, operational altitude, time on site, etc.) between each potential ISR plat-
form made it necessary to create a model for evaluation in order to determine the most 
capable asset to complete the mission.  All parameters discovered during the product re-
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search effort were used as inputs into the model to determine the number of a specific 
platform UASs to yield the appropriate level of system success.  Using the model results, 
the above quantitative factors were used to determine the final system measures of per-
formance (MOP) to best meet the customer needs. 
B.     PAIRWISE ANALYSIS AND QFD 
A survey was sent out to the stakeholders and the results were run through a pair-
wise comparison tool.   Operational requirement weights were established to support 
QFD analysis.  As can be seen in Figure 35, “Customer Requirements versus MOEs,” 
detection was the most important function to the stakeholders.  Operators described de-
tection as a major capability gap in their descriptive responses to the survey and men-
tioned the need for maritime surface radar assets. Figure 35 presents “Customer Re-
















Operational functions or activities were translated into operational measures of effectiveness 
(MOE) in the second level of the QFD.  MOEs were evaluated for relative importance and as-
signed numbers on a scale of low (3), medium (6), and high (9) (Figure 35). After the assign-
ment of proper scale to MOEs, a third level of mapping was performed to show the derivation 





Figure 37. “QFD 2. Design Characteristics Relative to Functions.”  A third level of the QFD, 






In addition to the formal analysis there were two Interim Project Reviews (IPRs) during 
our project execution.  Stakeholder feedback from each review was incorporated into all af-
fected analyses and deliverables. A brief sampling of representative feedback includes: 
IPR1 
• Establish queue for ISR assets 
• Define classification for “threat” 
• Establish AIS capability 
• Determine tracking capability/reestablish target if signal is lost 
• Understand data fusion technology amongst different assets 
IPR2 
• Clarify/define what is meant by “continuously tracking contacts” 
• Define whether C2 is within the scope of PMSW&RS 
• Reduce scope to evaluate time to detect, confirm, a pirate 
• Establish the use of Airborne Communications Relay. 





C.     CANDIDATE SYSTEM 
The Heron TP, Guardian and the LEMV systems are analyzed. 
  1.	   Simulation of Specific UASs 
 
 
Table 18. “UAS Characteristics to be used in Model.” 
 
Once the general parameters of interest have been determined (warning distance, radar 
ranges, pirate speeds, and protection zone size), the model was used to evaluate different types 
of UAS platforms.   Each UAS has unique characteristics such as speed, altitude and detection 
aperture (area of instantaneous scan).  These parameters were loaded into the model and the 
simulation was run to assess the performance in each operational situation.  The output of the 
model was used to determine the number of UASs required for each platform to achieve the 









UAV Cruising Speed Flight Endurance Cruising Altitude 
Heron 113 Knots 36 hours 20,000 ft 
LEMV: 80 knots 504 hours (21 days) 20,000 ft 
Guardian: 150 knots 25 hours 25,000 ft 
Scan Eagle: 60 knots 27 hours 20,000 ft 








Table 19. “Model Inputs for Medium Altitude UASs.” 
 
3.	   Outputs of the Model 
The number of UASs needed to meet the threshold and objective for each UAS config-
uration was generated from the simulation model. The model does not take into account UAS 
downtime due to unexpected repairs and maintenance.  To accommodate for real world opera-
tions, an additional UAS will be required to compensate for these downtimes and meet the full 
operation time on station. 
 
Table 20. “Model Outputs for Medium Altitude UASs.” 
 
  














Heron	   190	   24	   20,000	   160	   17	   800x800	   103	  
LEMV	   80	   504	   20,000	   60	   17	   800x800	   103	  




4.	   Recommendations 
The medium altitude concept was able to outperform the alternate concept (high and 
low attitude UASs) while using fewer total UASs and it can be completely operated and main-
tained from a land based launch site requiring less specialized equipment, manpower, and Na-
vy assets. The platform allocations are to be used for cost analysis and final selection. 
 






IV.	  ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
A.     SYSTEMS ENGINEERING ANALYSIS: EFFECTIVNESS AND      
PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT WITH MATRIX BASED DECISION ANALYSIS 
 In the mathematical model, the alternative with the highest sum of product score value 
is the best among the different alternatives.  Each one of the alternatives is assigned a weight 
value by the stakeholder and prioritization scheme, and this value is then applied in model cal-
culations to arrive at a final weight value. 
 
 
Table 22. “Alternatives Selection Decision Matrix.” 
Table 22 illustrates a snapshot of alternative selection decision matrix. This matrix is used as a 
tool to mathematically calculate and rank each MOP. Each alternative column contains score 
values calculated based on each alternative raw score scaled to its threshold and objective val-
ues. 
B.     SCORE NORMALIZATION 
 A question during the analysis was how to derive these scores, and how can they be 
used to compare to each other if the threshold and objective values of each of measure of per-
formance are can be expressed in different units and quantities.  This question is resolved by 
performing a “normalization” operation on the threshold and objective values. “Normalization” 
is a mathematical operation process where a maximum value of “1” is assigned to the “objec-
Heron LEMV Guardian
MOP: Range to detect 
RCS 25 SqM at 
minimum of 20K ft MSL
0.1743 0.73 1.00 0.00
MOP: LOS Capability 
Range 0.0626 1.00 1.00 1.00
MOP: Number of surface 
tracks while in sensor 
view
0.0658 1.00 1.00 0.80
MOP: Hours on station 
@ Mission Radius 0.1500 0.33 1.00 0.25
MOP: BLOS Capablility 
Range 0.1998 1.00 1.00 1.00
Surface Vessel detection 
RCS SqM Accuracy @ 
20K FT
0.1408 0.67 0.90 1.00
MOP Produce Visible & 
IR NIIRS Level 7 at 20K 
FT AGL w/Ideal Weather 
Conditions
0.0194 0.50 0.50 0.50
MOP:  Speed 0.1872 0.92 0.00 1.00
0.78 0.79 0.69Total Score
Decision Matrix





tive value,” and a minimum value of “0” is assigned to the “threshold” value; then the objec-
tive score value for each measure of performance is “scaled” into the max-min scale of 1 to 0. 
Using this scaling operation, all alternative scores can be combined and compared on an equal 
and leveled baseline. For example, for the Detection Range MOP, the threshold value is 80 
eighty miles, and the objective value is 200 miles, an alternative with a specification of 150 
miles can be “normalized” to a value of 0.583: 
 150− 80200− 80 = 0.583 
 
By using the normalization process, a raw specification value can be converted to a unit-less 
value that is used for comparison between different alternatives, all of which have different 





C.     WEIGHT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
There are a total of eight MOPs defined for this project. Each MOP has a weighting 
factor associated with it. Changing the weighting factor can change the alternative total score. 
Figure 38, “Sensitivity Analysis (Detection Range)” shows an example of the weighting factor 
sensitivity plots for detection range.  The lines indicate the change in the rankings of the vari-
ous alternatives throughout the variation in the attribute weights. The values of attribute 
weights only make sense in the 0 – 1 range. Investigating the ranking of the alternatives at an 
attribute weight of 0 indicates that the Guardian would be the highest ranked solution with re-
spect to Detection Range. If the attribute weighting were changed to 1, then the Heron and the 
LEMV would be tied for the highest ranking, with the Guardian as the lowest ranked solution 
alternative.  Each MOP was evaluated. The remainder of the charts and analysis can be found 
in the Appendix B: “Sensitivity Analysis.” 
 




D.     COST AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (CAIV) 
1.	   Scaled Cost 
The dollar figure in the CAIV analysis is a cost per flight hour metric (CPFH).  The 
CPFH operational metric is a compilation of operational manpower, fuel, maintenance, 
maintenance manpower, ground control expenses, consumables, and repairable items.  These 
operational elements contribute most significantly to costs that are directly related to aircraft 
flight time.  The hour portion of the CPFH metric is calculated based mission duration, which 
is also the basis of the analysis in determining the number of assets needed to complete the 
mission. The dollar (cost) portion is based on the following assumptions and cost analysis 
techniques supported by Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 4.2 Cost Department 
(Naval Air Systems Command, AIR 4.2.2 2010): 
• The higher the operational ceiling, the larger the search radius of the radar 
• The faster the operational speed, the more area the particular radar can cover 
• The longer the endurance, the more area the UAS can cover (dependent upon 
speed) 
• In situations where CPFH could not be found comparable platforms were ana-
lyzed and adjustments were made to arrive at a CPFH dollar value.  Adjust-
ments were consistent with NAVAIR 4.2 methodology 
• Endurance is NOT time on station. 
• Heron’s CPFH estimate leveraged off of the BAMS estimate generated by 
NAVAIR 4.2 as they have similar capability, and complexity adjustments were 
made. 
• Guardian’s CPFH is derived from MQ-9 Reaper’s CPFH as they are very simi-
lar platforms.  This was pulled directly from the Air Force Total Ownership 
Cost (AFTOC) data base that is updated quarterly.  Minor adjustments were 
made for capability. 
• If a range of data was given the mean was taken for each category 




• LEMV cost data is very immature and adjustments were made based on smaller 
airships and preliminary NAVAIR 4.2 estimates.  The adjustments took into ac-
count: 
o Increased payload capability 
o Increased loiter time 
o Number of engines 
o Fuel consumption 
o Operational/Maintenance/Ground control manpower 
o Size and complexity of the LEMV asset 
• All cost figures are in FY 12 dollars. 
Based on discussions with operations research analysts within the Army’s Cost division for 
UASs, the Army has not established a CPFH metric for LEMV; thus other avenues of cost es-
timation were pursued.  Data bases that are currently used to collect operational expenditures 
of Army assets are The Operating and Support Management Information System (OSMIS) and 
Army Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC).  These data 
bases log operational information on consumables and repairable items, mean time between 
failure, fuel consumption, and maintenance man hour information amongst other operational 
categories.  Additionally, NAVAIR 4.2 Cost Department developed a preliminary operational 
cost estimate on LEMV when it was proposed to the Navy.  Leveraging the early estimate, and 
information from the Army data bases, an operational cost estimate was generated and then 
normalized into a CPFH metric.  There were instances in which LEMV specific data was non-
existent; thus data on a comparable airship was used to generate portions of the estimate. Fuel 
consumption is based on the engine type, number of engines and LEMV mission duration 
which is normalized into a CPFH.  The final piece of the CPFH metric is operational manpow-
er (pilots).  For both the fuel and operational manpower, the estimate was adjusted for infla-
tion. 
Tables 23 and 24 show the results of the cost analysis and the assumptions applied.  On 
a dollar per flight-hour basis only, LEMV is the clear solution; however, the asset’s capabilities 
must be taken into consideration. The maximum mission time is assumed to be twenty-four 
hours a day for seven consecutive days.  This is how the 168 hour mission time is generated.  
To generate the scaled cost calculation, “Dollar per Flight Hour” is multiplied by quantity of 
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“UASs to Complete Mission” (threshold/objective) which is then multiplied by the “Mission 
Duration”.  To scale the cost, the “Total Cost” number was divided by one million.  The calcu-
lations account for down time due to fueling, standard maintenance, and time to get to and 
from area of interest. Table 23 illustrates the figures described in the CAIV analysis.  Flowing 
from left to right the cost per flight hour is multiplied by the “# of UASs to Complete Mission” 
by the duration to get the mission cost. (scaled cost = mission cost / 1 million).  
Table 24 illustrates the figures used to calculate the OMOE values as described in 
OMOE Analysis. Moving from top to bottom the attribute capability weights are multiplied by 
the decision matrix data to get weighted values.  The weighted values are then summed left to 





Table 23. “CAIV Analysis.” 
 
Table 24. “UAS OMOE.” 
  

























Heron 2 2 168  $   2,251,200  $   2,251,200 2.251 2.251 0.780
LEMV 4 5 168  $   1,411,200  $   1,764,000 1.411 1.764 0.789
Guardian 4 4 168  $   3,158,400  $   3,158,400 3.158 3.158 0.690
Detection














0.174 0.063 0.066 0.150 0.200 0.141 0.019 0.187 1.000
Heron 0.73 1.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.67 0.50 0.92
LEMV 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.50 0.00
Guardian 0.00 1.00 0.80 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00
Heron 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.20 0.09 0.01 0.17 0.780
LEMV 0.17 0.06 0.07 0.15 0.20 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.789
Guardian 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.20 0.14 0.01 0.19 0.690
Decision Matrix Data
Attributed Capability Weights Multiplied by Decision Matrix Data (weighted value)
Attributed Capability Weights From Decision Matrix
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2.	   Overall Measure of Effectiveness (OMOE) Analysis 
Detailed OMOE analysis in the areas of Detection Range, Line of Sight, Track 
Capacity, Hours on Station, Beyond Line of Sight, Detection Accuracy Range, and 
NIIRS (sensitivity analysis) was performed in order to determine which UAS asset per-
formed the best independently of cost.  The calculation applied “attribute capability 
weights” from the decision matrix in the aforementioned categories, as well as calculated 
“decision matrix data.”  The “attributed capability weights” were multiplied by the “deci-
sion matrix data” in each category for each of the three UAS alternatives to generate a 
weighted capability value.  These values were then summed together to determine the 
OMOE data points ultimately determining the most capable UAS.  Note the “1” values in 
the OMOE table indicate that the objective value was met relative to the MOPs. 
Based on the OMOE analysis in Table 24, it is clear that independent of cost, 
LEMV has outperformed the Heron TP and Guardian.  LEMV exceeds the other two 
considerations in hours on station and provides the greatest overall probability of success-
fully completing the mission at the objective and threshold levels.  However, in order for 
LEMV to meet the objective, an additional asset was needed.  With the resulting weights 
generated from the OMOE analysis, combined with the objective and threshold analysis, 











Figure 39. “CAIV Analysis Threshold Chart.” 
The three assets meet or exceed the threshold of 80 % (< 90%) confidence that they will 
detect a threat in the area of interest, utilizing the quantity of assets in the Thresh-
old/Objective analysis.  LEMVs ETOS had to be normalized in order to make an effec-
tive comparison to Heron TP and Guardian as it far exceeded the other two candidates.  
In addition, the LEMV is the least expensive on a cost per flight-hour basis which makes 
it a very desirable option that has the ability to complete the mission at hand at or slightly 
above the 80% threshold. This ultimately does not change the outcome.  The LEMV asset 
not only ranks the highest in capability but is also the lowest in cost.  Heron TP ranks 
very close to LEMV, however; it is more expensive for slightly less capability. Guardian 
is the most expensive due to its high CPFH and also provides the least capability. This 
analysis allows the user to make an informed decision on desired capability compared to 





















































V.	   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.	   Risks 
The PMSW&RS project risks are summarized in the following section, and repre-
sented in Figure 41, “PMSW&RS Project Risks.” 
 
 
Figure 41. “PMSW&RS Project Risks.”  This risk matrix shows the current risks associ-
ated with the PMSW&RS program. 
a. Risk 1: UAS may not be granted access to use forward operating base (L2, C3) 
§ Description of risk:    UAS forward operating base is not identified for UAS launch 
and recovery operations, 
§ Statement of cause: The identified airfields are not on U.S. Soil and would require 
local basing agreements.  No conclusive evidence was discovered to assure the team 
that host nations would grant basing rights for the UAE and Maldives FOBs. 
§ Consequence if risk is realized:  Mission radius will significantly increase and reduce 
effective time on station. 
     b.	   Risk 2: Unsuccessful use of detection queuing filters (L3, C5) 












§ Statement of cause: Very little is known at this time about the success rate of these 
software systems.  Given the quantity of ships in the HOA AOR, it could prove to be 
a major technical and cost risk for success. 
§  Consequence if risk is realized: UAS Operator workload would increase and produc-
tivity would decrease, thereby decreasing the time needed to detect Pirate Mother 
Ships and then safely warning commercial vessels of their position, thus decreasing 
the probability of successful avoidance. 
c.	   Risk 3: Commercial vessels not utilitzing the automatic identification system 
(AIS) (L4, C4) 
§ Description of risk:  Civilian captains choose not to utilize AIS. 
§ Statement of cause: In the HOA AOR currently, civilian captains have been turning 
off their AIS transponder because the sensor was being used as a tracking device by 
Pirate Mother Ships to find commercial vessels. 
§ Consequence if risk is realized: UAS may have difficulty discerning Pirate Mother-





2.	   Conclusions and Recommendations 
The PMSW&RS project tried to tackle a very complicated and multi-faceted real 
world problem in the naval maritime surface domain. The recommended system of 
choice represents the result of several logical and methodical system engineering analysis 
exercises that differentiates all relevant alternatives allowing the selecting of the best al-
ternative. 
 The optimal UAS selection for the PMSW&RS mission utilizes the LEMV to 
achieve acceptable performance at the least cost.  LEMV dominated the other candidates 
by achieving the lowest CAIV value of 1.41 and 1.76 at 80% and 90% confidence inter-
val respectively. The Heron TP has a lower CAIV value than Guardian at 2.25 for both 
80% and 90% detection probabilities.  The Guardian UAS CAIV value was the highest of 
all three assets at 3.15 for both 80% and 90% detection probability respectively. If the 
evaluation is based on performance only, ignoring cost, the LEMV UAS provides the 
best option to the stakeholders. (Note: The LEMV requires an additional asset to meet the 
objective. This has already been accounted for in the CAIV and OMOE analysis. If cost 
is the most significant consideration, the LEMV would provide the best option as well. 
 The LEMV UAS is the recommended asset for monitoring and early warning of 
piracy activities in the HOA AOR. The LEMV achieves both the performance threshold 
of 80% and objective of 90% at the lowest cost. Second to LEMV would be Heron TP 
UAS followed by Guardian UAS. 
 
Table 23. “CAIV Analysis.” 
Table 23 illustrates the figures described in the CAIV analysis.  Flowing from left to 
right, the cost per flight hour is multiplied by the “# of UASs to Complete Mission” by 
the duration to get the mission cost (scaled cost = mission cost / 1 million). 
 

























Heron 2 2 168  $   2,251,200  $   2,251,200 2.251 2.251 0.780
LEMV 4 5 168  $   1,411,200  $   1,764,000 1.411 1.764 0.789
Guardian 4 4 168  $   3,158,400  $   3,158,400 3.158 3.158 0.690
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3.	   Future Work 
The limited scope of the PMSW&RS project necessitates that some aspects of the 
system and associated external nodes could only be transiently evaluated.  There are addi-
tional functionalities, capabilities or solutions that can be further expanded upon. 
After looking at multiple UASs one of the key items not discussed by each of the 
military vendors was integration with existing commercial systems.  While this scope 
was limited to air vehicle functions, perhaps the quickest way to increase capability 
would involve the integration of command and control with systems such as AIS data-
bases and ship registry databases at the Maritime Security Center, Horn of Africa 
(MSCHOA).  By creating a synthetic AIS registry in an AIS system database, the world 
would have visibility of suspected pirate mother ships.  Suspect pirate mother ships de-
tected and tracked by a UAS could be given synthetic AIS registries which could be 
broadcast and uploaded into databases used by commercial industry.  This would provide 
wide and instant access to all parties involved.  This could represent the most effective 
way to provide communications quickly to all parties. 
Other considerations for future research involve the inclusion of pirate interdic-
tion procedures into the concept of operation.  Evolving the systems operational proce-
dure to include interdiction may enhance the anti-piracy activity.  One direction may be 
to consider the use of weaponized UASs with careful consideration given to international 
legal issues. This system currently stops at the collection, evaluation and transmission of 
surface contact information, but on-board weapons may dramatically deter piracy.  In the 
absence of the AIS solution presented above, an alternative would be to explore the 
broadcasting of a warning signal from a UAV to commercial vessels within the HOA 
AOR directly from the UAV V/UHF radios.  Such a signal would provide the location 
and heading of suspected pirates similar to a weather warning. 
Currently, PMSW&RS gathers data on unknown surface contacts and transmits 
this information to command and control.  The role that command and control performs 
was not evaluated in great detail due to the limited scope of the project.  Command and 
control is responsible for discriminating received information, alerting the commercial 
vessels of an imminent attack, and organizing piracy interdiction.  There is opportunity in 
future work on processing and dissemination of the gathered ISR data to increase the ef-
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fectiveness of the anti-piracy activities.  The use of AIS could be a method where the 
identified threat information could be transmitted as a ghost signature for broadcast and 




APPENDIX A: LIST OF ACRONYMS 
Acronym Term 
ADM Acquisition Decision Memorandum 
BAMS Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 
C2 Command and Control 
CAIV Cost as an Independent Variable 
CNO Chief of Naval Operation 
DoD Department of Defense 
DON Department of Navy 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GCS Ground Control Station 
HOA AOR Horn of Africa Area of Responsibility 
INCOSE International Council on Systems Engineering 
IPR Interim Project Reviews 
IPT Integrated Product Team 
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration Development System 
SCIP Joint UAS Common Control Station 
MSSE Masters of Systems Engineering 
NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
OPTEVFOR Operational Test and Evaluation Force 
OT&E Operational Test and Evaluation 
PEO Program Executive Office 
PM Program Manager 
PMP Project Management Plan 
R&M Reliability and Maintainability 
RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
SE Systems Engineering 
STANAG Standard Agreement 
U&W Unmanned Aviation and Weapons 
UAE 
UAS 
United Arab Emirates 
Unmanned Aircraft (or Air) Systems 
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UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UCAS Unmanned Combat Air Systems 
USD (AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 









































APPENDIX B: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 42, “Sensitivity Analysis (Detection Range)” shows the weighting factor sensitivi-
ty plots for all eight measures of performance.  The measures of performance include: 
Detection range, line of sight, tracking, hours on station, beyond line of sight, detection 
accuracy range, NIIRS, and speed. 
 
Figure 42. “Sensitivity Analysis (Detection Range).” 
Figure 42 shows the weights sensitivity chart for Detection Range Measure of Perfor-
mance. The alternative with the highest slope is Heron TP with a slope value of 1.2111; 
therefore Heron TP is the alternative that is most sensitive to weight changes for the De-




Figure 43. “Sensitivity Analysis (Line of Sight.)” 
As shown in Figure 43, the alternative with the highest absolute slope value is Guardian 
with the absolute slope value of 0.5061; therefore, Guardian is the alternative that is most 
sensitive to weight changes for the Line of Sight MOP. 
 
Figure 44. “Sensitivity Analysis (Track Capability).” 
Figure 44 shows the weight sensitivity plot for Track Capacity MOP. The alternative with 
the highest slope value is LEMV with the slope value of 0.6474; therefore, LEMV is the 




Figure 45. “Sensitivity Analysis (Hours on Station).” 
Figure 45 shows the alternative with the highest slope value is Heron TP with the slope 
value of 1.1291. Heron TP is the alternative that is most sensitive to weight changes for 






Figure 46. “Sensitivity Analysis (Beyond Line of Sight.)” 
Figure 46 shows the alternative that is most sensitive to weight change is Heron TP for 
Beyond Line of Sight MOP with the absolute slope value of 0.6752. 
 
Figure 47. “Sensitivity Analysis (Detection Accuracy Range).” 
Figure 47 shows the alternative that is most sensitive to weight change for the Detection 




Figure 48. “Sensitivity Analysis NIIRS).” 
Figure 48 “Sensitivity Analysis (NIIRS)” shows the alternative that is most sensitive to 






Figure 49. “Sensitivity Analysis (Speed.)”  
Figure 49 shows the alternative that is most sensitive to weight change for the Speed 




APPENDIX C: STAKEHOLDER REFINEMENT 
The following stakeholders attended IPR 1 or 2 
1. Ron Carlson; rrcarlso@nps.edu 
2. Dr. Rama Gehris; rdgehris@nps.edu 
3. Dr. Dick Millar; rcmillar@nps.edu 
4. Wayne Parsons; wayne.parsons@navy.mil 
5. Steve Daniel Stephen.daniel@navy.mil 
6. Pete Wolt; peter.wolt@navy.mil 
7. Cecil Bradley;  cecil.d.bradley@boeing.com 
8. Bruce Newell; Burce.newell@boeing.com 
9. Dan Gabriel; dan.w.gabriel@boeing.com 
 
The stakeholders’ expert opinions and experience provided insight on existing 
systems, capabilities of specific payloads, data networks, information systems, communi-
cation systems, as well as others that were utilized in developing PMSW&RS.  Further-
more, the stakeholders’ experience alerted the team to other key issues that needed to be 
considered.  The stakeholders that were present during both IPRs come from both the 
contractor and government sectors which allows for a broad perspective on the end user’s 
wants and needs. 
The stakeholders at the first Integrated Project Review (IPR) brought up critical 
topics that needed to be discussed.  One key issue discussed was how to identify potential 
threats, not only from a friend or foe standpoint, but from a physical standpoint.  Descrip-
tions of the capabilities of the sensors on board the Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) are 
very limited.  Basically, how clear would a picture be of a potential threat from twenty 
thousand feet?  Based on the problem descriptions, the stakeholders’ contention is the 
sensors will provide enough detail in the image that an analyst will be able to determine if 
a pirate has taken over the ship.  This leveraged into suggestions that manned assets could 
complete the mission rather than just restricting potential options of PMSW&RS to un-
manned aircraft.  A critical constraint mandated is that all assets must be in the field or 
fielded by FY12.  This severely restricts potential solutions available to PMSW&RS. 
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It was established that a “kill chain” needed to be implemented in PMSW&RS as 
well as a trigger for the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets.  
Stakeholders suggested that a space-based system such as a satellite could be a potential 
solution. Initial concepts of PMSW&RS call for a 24/7 type of surveillance for an ex-
tended duration. The concern is that this type of effort is very expensive. Also, it is ques-
tionable how this will affect tracking potential threats if that persistent surveillance is 
broken.  It was determined that projections can be made predicting the path of a ship.  
This is critical information as an ISR asset could lose track of a ship and be able to regain 
its position. 
Automatic Information System (AIS) was a very important topic that was dis-
cussed with the stakeholders. AIS is a line-of-sight based system; a stakeholder that 
works on another UAS platform indicated that while in the air, this UAS picked up an 
AIS signal from a ship off the coast of Florida.  This information provided some indica-
tion of the capability of the AIS system.  Further details will need to be researched con-
cerning what information can/needed to be exchanged from a ship to a UAS and if there 
was an existing data link system already in the field that can be utilized.  Essentially, can 
the AIS data system exchange more than just a location of a ship?  A stakeholder then 
mentioned that there is a problem with “spoofing” an AIS signal.  This would mean that 
there needs to be another method of detection outside of AIS. 
Refinement concepts of PMSW&RS continued to be an issue.  PMSW&RS is re-
sponsible for detection, identification, and tracking of potential pirate threats.  All analy-
sis performed will serve as a function of anther system outside of PMSW&RS.  With that 
scope defined, it needs to be determined what data would need to be sent to this analyti-
cal system.  PMSW&RS must ensure that the right information is sent to the right place. 
The second IPR yielded a productive experience in refining and gathering intelli-
gence from the stakeholders.  AIS was the first topic discussed.  Stakeholders raised con-
cern again about pirates “spoofing” AIS as well as pirates shutting a ships onboard AIS 
system down.  Furthermore, there was discussion on what communications systems were 
already in existence and how did the pirates communicate with the merchant sailors.  A 
suggestion that was made that to help eliminate this problem was to begin this process 
before a ship leaves port.  All ships must port at some point, and with that comes infor-
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mation as well as a location.  There are shipping logs that document the arrival and de-
parture of ships as well and tracking can start there.  Tracking and relocating was brought 
up again, and there was discussion on how to relocate once a ships signal was lost. 
Signals analysis and concepts was a critical area of interest.  Can we identify a 
footprint on a radio signal?  What are the capabilities of exploiting signals across differ-
ent frequencies?  Can signals analysis aid in the task of classification of a ship as it is the 
biggest challenge?   A few key points were raised through this discussion.  One consider-
ation was to mark a ship somehow which will allow an ISR asset to easily come back.  
Another thought was to regain tracking by identifying a ship’s transmitter as no two 
transmitters are exactly the same. 
Calculations for PMSW&RS have to be generated for probability of detection, 
square miles of the area of interest, and number of assets required to complete the mis-
sion.  To narrow the area in question the idea was to provide safe passage through specif-
ic shipping lanes.  This way the entire gulf did not have to be monitored and aggressively 
cut back the score of the problem.  The problem with this idea is that merchant sailors are 
not using specific lanes because the guarded shipping lanes are  indirect to the final desti-
nation, and it is costing too much money to travel them. 
Data fusion was another challenge for PMSW&RS.   With all of the sensors on an 
ISR asset how can the data be fused together to create usable information?  Can an over-
lay of AIS data onto radar?  A stakeholder mentioned a Coast Guard ISR platform called 
Guardian that has some of the features that were mentioned.  It can integrate AIS and 
overlay it onto radar as well as provide optical files and integrate Electro-optical inferred 
(EOIR) data.  Furthermore, it can merge AIS data with the Global information Grid 
(GIG).  This is a viable option to aid in the solution to this problem. 
Direction, scope, and a path forward are all results of the two IPRS.   The stake-
holders proved to be incredibly knowledgeable and offered keen insight that allowed 
PMSW&RS to narrow the scope of the problem, provide clarity and knowledge to over-





APPENDIX D: SURFACE RADAR DETECTION REQUIREMENT DEVELOP-
MENT SUPPORT 
 
The Radar Cross Section (RCS) of an object is a function of the return energy re-
ceived by a radar system. The RCS value of a target is the return energy density divided 
by the radar transmitted energy. If an object is small or employs stealth technology, the 
returned energy will be too small to be successfully processed into a contact by the radar 
receiver.  A small RCS value of a vessel can be masked by the characteristics of the envi-
ronment it is in.  In order to determine the proper surveillance systems best suited the sys-
tem needs, the team gathered information on the characteristic radar cross section of vari-
ous types of ships.  They needed to determine the minimum sized vessel that the system 
may have to detect.  This will directly affect the probability of detection and is a function 
of UAS altitude, the power and angle of incident of transmitted energy, and distance from 
target. 
Typical ranges of RCS signatures for various ships can be found in Table 26.  The 
range covers different aspects of transmitted energy or direction of view.  The low side of 
the ranges is indicated with the letters that represent B (Broadside) or S (Stern on) as-
pects.  The high side of the ranges is indicated with one or more letters including those 
listed above as well as BW (Bow), BWO (Bow On) and Q (Quarterdeck).  The smallest 
vessel listed is an in-shore fishing vessel with a minimum RCS of 3 m2.  The SeaVueTM 
X-band surveillance radar can detect a 1 m2 RCS return at 30 miles distance, in a sea state 
of three at the highest transmitted power setting of 50 kW but at an altitude of only 600 


























APPENDIX E: ADDITIONAL ARCHITECTURE CHARTS AND 
GRAPHS 
 
Figure 50. “Operational Activities to Systems” 
 














Figure 51. “Operational Activities to Systems.” 
 












Figure 52. “Operational Activities to Systems.” 
 










Figure 53. “MOP Detect.” 
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Figure 56. “MOP Surface Tracks.” 
MOP_Surface_Tracks «Performance Measures»
MOP: Number of Surface Tracks
«MeasureOfPerformance»
The system shall track Suface Contacts
Maritime Radar Field of 
View
>= 20,000 Ft 
above Mean Sea 
Level
























The sensor Payload shall produce Imagery to 
support Classification and Identification
>= 20,000 Ft 
above Mean Sea 
Level



































Not	  Squawking	  AIS	  
Stationary,	  little	  to	  no	  movement	  (In	  
Commercial	  lane=Greater	  probability)	  
Small	  vessels	  operating	  alongside	  
Towing	  of	  small	  vessels/skiffs	  
High	  speed	  maneuvering	  with	  rapid	  
changes	  in	  velocity	  
Spoofing	  AIS	  
Erratic	  course	  changes	  




APPENDIX F: MODELLING USING EXCEL SOFTWARE 
 
Modeling and simulation allows for the examination of system performance be-
fore it is built as well as performing an analysis of alternative solutions in determining the 
best set of components to use in the system.   For the purpose of this project, two EXCEL 
models were used to evaluate the tradeoff of system requirements such as number of 
UASs, speed of UAVs, UAV endurance time, UAS radar range, the required warning we 
want to give commercial vessels, and the size of the patrol area.  Using these inputs the 
models will compute the theoretical system results of the probability of success for de-
tecting enemy mother ships with enough time to warn commercial vessels of an imminent 
attack.  The early model was used to simulate the first concept of using a medium altitude 
UAS launched from a land-based site to perform pirate ship detections and tracking, and 
a low altitude UAS launched from a sea based asset for EO identification.  After consid-
ering the high expense and issues of requiring a sea-based asset for launching UASs, a 
second concept model was developed to simulate a pure medium altitude UAS launched 
from a land-based site.  These UASs will operate at a medium altitude level and will be 
able to dip to a lower altitude also to perform identification. These models allow for the 
adjustment of each parameter to determine the impact to the system’s successful detec-
tion capability for various possible configurations. 
The team needed to ascertain the size of the patrol area that could successfully be 
patrolled.  Too big of an area could result in ineffective support and early warning alerts 
for the commercial vessels from pirate attacks.  In the same manner, a patrol area that is 
too small, results in an unnecessary constrictive burden to the commercial shipping by 
forcing a narrow corridor of safety.  Because of the large number of variables between 
the possible components of the system, the modeling would determine the proper scan-
ning area size for each system configuration. 
Another factor was the uncertainty in the number of UASs needed to cover the ar-
ea of interest that would give a satisfactory probability of success.    The inherent differ-
ences of performance (speed of UAV, Speed of target vessels, operational altitude, and 
time on site, etc.) between each potential ISR platform made it necessary to create a 
model.  All parameters discovered during the product research effort were used as inputs 
into the model to generate the needed results.  Using the model results would allow defi-
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nition of quantitative factors for use in the final system configuration that best meets cus-
tomer needs.  These and other factors were evaluated using the models. 
The model was used to help determine thresholds and objectives for system level 
MOPs such as UAV speed, UAV endurance, and radar range.  Starting with the median 
values of currently available UAS capabilities as inputs to the model, each MOP was ad-
justed individually to determine the necessary value that achieves the system’s detection 
threshold and objective.  The initial median values that were used for speed, endurance, 
and radar range are 150 knots, twenty hours, and sixty nautical miles respectively and the 
results are shown in Table 27. 
 
 UAV Speed UAV Endurance Radar Range 
Threshold 100 knots 12 hours 80 nm 
Objective 200 knots 24 hours 200 nm 
Table 27.  “UAV MOPs Threshold and Objective.” 
Two Concepts Modeled 
There are two operational concepts that were modeled using a "Back of Enve-
lope" (BOE) simulation using Microsoft EXCEL. The first concept used Medium Alti-
tude UASs launched from a land-based site to perform the scanning and tracking of all 
ships within the preselected zone.  When an unidentified ship meets predetermined crite-
ria for a pirate mother ship, this potential target will trigger a low altitude UAS launch 
from a ship-based site located within the patrolled area to perform detailed classification 
and identification of friend or foe.  The number of medium altitude UASs, low altitude 
UASs, protection zone size, distances from ship and land base launch sites, UAV speed, 
UAV endurance, refueling times and the required warning distance for commercial ves-
sels have been evaluated.   The results of this model compared and traded off these fac-
tors and the various UASs available to use with the system to yield the best probabilistic 
percentage of successful detections. The values shown in Table 29 are the results for the 




Table 28. “Concept 1 Model Output.” UAS type and quantity tradeoff. 
It was found that to meet the threshold of 80% successful detection, the system needed to 
have a protection zone size no larger than 800 by 800 nm and a minimum of two medium 
altitude UASs with two low altitude UASs. However, the team learned that payloads 
were available for medium altitude UASs able to perform EO/IR identification and classi-
fication at their cruising altitudes.  The medium and low altitude UAS concept was set 
aside to consider the simpler and potentially more cost effective solution of using medi-
um altitude UASs for all ISR functions. 
The second concept uses only UASs that fly at medium height altitude launched 
from a land-based site. These medium altitude UASs will be able to fly to the protection 
zone, scan the area for potential mother ships, and when the predetermined criteria is met, 
as defined in the medium +_low concept. For a potential mother ship the medium altitude 
UAS will decrease altitude, if necessary (depending on UAS and radar package capabil-
ity), and perform EO/IR identification.  This option will not require a ship-based launch-
ing capability and does not need low altitude UASs to perform EO/IR identification.  
When the UAS is done identifying the ship, it will return to a scanning function. The 
number of medium altitude UASs needed, protection zone size, distances from land base 
launch sites, UAV speed, UAV endurance, UAS payload detection range, refueling times, 
the required warning distance for commercial vessels, and the percent of successful de-
tections have been evaluated.  The results of this model also compared and traded off the-
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  Low	  Alt	  
Ship	  launched	  UAV	  
MA	  UAV's:	  3	  
LA	  UAV's:	  2	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se factors and the various UASs available to use with the system to yield the best proba-
bilistic percentage of successful detections. The values shown in Table 30 are the results 
for the different UASs used in medium altitude only configuration. 
 
Table 29.  “Concept 2 Model Output.”  UAS Type and quantity tradeoff. 
To meet the threshold of 80% successful detection, the system could achieve this with 
only three medium altitude UASs. This concept was then considered superior because it 
requires less operational UASs than medium + low concept, and it can be completely op-
erated and maintained from a land-based launch site requiring less specialized equipment, 
manpower, and Navy assets. 
Probabilistic nature of the model 
To accurately model pirate ship attacks upon commercial freighters, the model 
has two statistical input variables for entering known historical data of pirate ship attacks: 
mean time between attacks and the associated variance.  Using the historical data from 
the ICC-IMB 2010 annual piracy report, the calculated mean time between attacks is for-
ty-five hours with a variance of 20.3 hours (ICC-International Maritime Bureau 2010).  
These values are used to generate the random times each mother ship will enter the pro-
tection zone.  Another normally distributed random variable is used to determine where 
the pirate ship enters the protection zone in relation to the UASs scanning the area.  By 
randomly varying this distance between the pirate vessel entering the protection zone and 
the UAS, it will take the UAS varying amounts of time to perform initial detection of that 
pirate vessel.  This initial detection time along with the pirate vessel speed will determine 
the distance of penetration into the protection zone.  Using these probabilistic values and 
specific UAS characteristics, the model will determine the probability of system success. 
Model Mechanics 
The model first models the back and forth scanning pattern and path length that 
the UASs will use to scan the entire protection zone.  By using the inputted dimensions of 
the protection zone and the UAS payload radar range, the number of zigzags needed for 
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the radar to cover the entire protection zone will be calculated and then the overall path 
length can be calculated.   The inputted number of UASs will determine the time and dis-
tance spacing between the UASs along the path when they are performing round-the-
clock take offs, flying to the protection zone, scanning, returning, and refueling.  While 
the UASs are scanning, a pirate ship is randomly generated and enters into the protection 
zone at a random location and at a constant speed.  Depending on the UAV speed and 
distance to the generated pirate ship, the model will calculate how far into the protection 
zone the pirate ship has penetrated before first detection by the next UAS.  The next step 
is to calculate the time needed to perform the final identification and classification, which 
differs for the two concepts.  For medium + low concept, the model will calculate and 
sum up the time it will take for a low altitude UAS to be launched from a Navy asset lo-
cated within the protection zone, the time needed to fly to the pirate ship, and the time 
required to perform EO/IR identification of Friend-or-Foe.  For the medium only concept, 
the model will calculate and sum the UAS descent time, if needed, for the selected medi-
um altitude UAS to fly down to a lower altitude to perform EO/IR identification and the 
time needed to perform the EO/IR identification and classification. These calculated 
times along with the pirate ship speed are used to determine the final pirate ship distance 
into the protection zone.  If that particular pirate ship is detected before it reaches the 
minimum warning distance, then that simulation is counted as a successful detection.  
The overall system successful detection rate is calculated by simulating one thousand 
randomly generated pirate attacks and calculating the percentage of system success out of 




Table 30. “Simulation Input Parameters.” 
 
 This is a list of input parameters use in the Microsoft Excel model to determine overall 







Simulation	  Input	  Paramter Type Units
Default	  
Value
Protection Zone width Variable nm 1000
Protection Zone length Variable nm 1000
mothership velocity Variable kt 18
Number of med Alt. UAVs Variable Number 2
med Alt UAV flying Altitude Variable feet 20000
med Alt UAV scan range (radius) Derived nm 20
med Alt UAV speed Variable kt 300
med Alt UAV Edurance time Variable hr 27
med Alt UAV Ship/Base to zone travel time Variable hr 4
med Alt UAV Refueling time Variable hr 2
Low Alt UAV speed Variable kt 80
Low Alt UAV Set-up and Launch time Variable hr 1
Low Alt UAV Ship to protection zone (if not in zone) Variable nm 200
Low Alt UAV Ship to zone time (if not in zone) derived hr 3
Low Alt UAV round trip time/#UAVs derived hr 1
Number of Low Altitude UAV's on hand Variable Number 1
Motherships time between attacks Variable (mean) hr 20
Width of UAV Scan Area derived nm 800
Length of UAV ScanArea derived nm 800
Number of Zig Zags needed to scan entire zone derived Number 6
Length of Zig Zag pattern derived nm 650.0
Width of Zig Zag pattern derived nm 650.0
Distance between Zig Zags needed to scan entire zone derived nm 133.3
Total number of Zig Zags derived Number 6
Total Distance of Zig Zag scan path derived nm 5200.0
Number of hi alt UAVs scanning at a time (considering overlap) derived Number 2.1
Search Distance between UAV derived nm 2453
Max distance across Scan zone from center of scan zone derived nm 565.69
Required pirate time Warning around commerical ship variable hr 6
Required protection Distance around ship constant nm 102
med Altitiude UAV radar detection accuracy constant Percent 90
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